Kent Resilience Forum

PREPARING FOR EMERGENCIES IN KENT AND MEDWAY

Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan

PUBLIC VERSION
(contact details removed)

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Issue and Review Register

Summary of changes	Version number & date	Approved by
Version 2: Complete re-draft Tony Harwood: Resilience and Emergencies Manager New Appendix N Mark Norfolk: Operations Manager – Trading Standards	N/A May 2016	 Mike Overbeke: Group Head Public Protection
'Draft' watermark removed from risk assessment	N/A September 2016	Tony Harwood
2017 Update	N/A May 2017	Tony Harwood
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Conversion to Multi-agency Plan	1.0 October 2019	Tony Harwood: Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager

Compiled by: Date: October 2019

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Approved by: Date: October 2019

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Role: Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager

Organisation: KCC Growth, Environment and Transport

Contents

Distribution List

Name	Role/Organisation
DCLG RED	Government Department
Defra (Animal & Plant Health Agency)	Government Department
Defra (Fera Science Limited)	Government Department
Director of Public Health	KCC
Director of Public Health	Medway Council
Kent County Council	KCC Trading Standards on Call Manager KCC Resilience & Emergency Planning Service KCC Highways (HMC) KCC Press Office KCC Internal Communications
Environment Agency Incident Management Business Partner Kent, South London & East Sussex	Environment Agency
Environmental Health Leads	Kent Districts & Medway Council
Head of KCC Trading Standards	KCC
Head of Kent Resilience Team	Kent Fire and Rescue Service
KCC Duty Directors and Tactical Managers	KCC
KCC Natural Environment & Coast Manager	KCC
KCC Public Rights of Way & Access Manager	KCC
Medway Council	Medway Council Trading Standards Medway Council Resilience & Emergency Planning Service
Operations Manager KCC Trading Standards	KCC
Public Health England South East Centre Director	Public Health England
Resilience Leads	Kent Districts

1. Aim

This emergency plan sets out the planning and response framework for notifiable and other serious animal or plant disease outbreaks within the administrative boundary of Kent and Medway, as well as outlining the broader community impacts of such an event.

2. Introduction

Animal and plant disease outbreaks can have significant negative public health, environmental, economic and social impacts. Effective emergency planning and response helps ensure that the good health of both farmed and non-commercial animals and plants, and that our livestock, arable, forestry, horticultural and tourism industries are safeguarded, and that any resultant harm to biodiversity and biomass is addressed.

In the UK, plant and animal health and welfare are devolved matters; the responsible body in England is the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).

In the event of a notifiable animal or plant disease outbreak, there will be a co-ordinated approach to disease control and eradication, with close working between stakeholders.

The Animal & Plant Health Agency (APHA), working alongside Defra, takes the operational lead in preparing for and controlling outbreaks and incidents of notifiable diseases of plants and animals in England.

Each country in the UK publishes a contingency plan for notifiable diseases of animals, which sets out the roles, responsibilities, systems and structures in place to respond to disease and highlights the important work undertaken to prevent disease incursion and to prepare for emergencies. The Defra (England) plan can be accessed through the following link:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/758789/contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-animals-2018.pdf

The responsibilities of public agencies for plant health are set out in the Plant Health Act 1967. This divides the lead responsibility between the Forestry Commission, which are responsible for the protection of forest trees and timber products in England, and Defra, having responsibility for other aspects of plant health.

The Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) Local Authority Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease Contingency Plan template can be found at Annex M and has been customised to fit a Kent County Council context.

3. Legislation

The following legislation provides for the Defra, KCC, Medway Council and partner statutory duties and powers that may be utilised in the event of a notifiable or other serious animal or plant disease outbreak.

- **Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA):** The Act places a statutory duty on KCC and Medway Council (and other category 1 and 2 responders) to plan and respond to major emergencies. The definition of an emergency at part 1 of the Act specifically references: 'An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom' which threatens 'Disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life'.

- **Animal Health Act 1981 (amended by Animal Health Act 2002):** The Act places statutory duties upon a range of agencies to respond in the event of a confirmed notifiable animal disease outbreak and gives powers for the Minister to make orders for preventing the spread of notifiable animal diseases.

- **Aquatic Animal Health (England & Wales) Regulations 2009:** Where notifiable diseases are suspected or confirmed, disease control measures are applied in the form of a designation notice to movements of live and dead aquatic animals, and to certain site activities.

- **European Communities Act 1972:** The European Communities Act 1972 is now utilised to implement a range of European animal health and welfare legislation aimed at protecting human health.

- **Plant Health Act 1967:** The Act places statutory duties upon a range of agencies to respond in the event of a confirmed notifiable plant disease outbreak and gives powers for the Minister to make orders for preventing the spread of notifiable plant diseases.

- **Plant Health (England) Order 2015:** This Act contains measures to control the importation of potentially infective material, prevent the spread of plant pests and requirements for plant health movement documents.

- **Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981:** The Act addresses nature conservation, the countryside (including public rights of way) and restrictions on the introduction of certain animals and plants to the UK.

4. Wider Stakeholders

The livestock, agricultural, horticultural and forestry industries and Kent and Medway's wider environment, and economy are served by a range of representative, trade and other interest groups. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a specific stakeholder working group to supplement and support the integrated

emergency management response by KCC and Medway Council and its professional partners.

Farming, Trade, Logistics and Landowner Bodies and Unions

Organisations such as the National Farmers Union (NFU), Country Land and Business Association, Road Haulage Association, Livestock Auctioneers Association, Kent Smallholders Association, Tenant Farmers Association, British Horse Society, Federation of Small Businesses and Tourist Boards may represent businesses affected by an outbreak.

Local Veterinary Practitioners

Local Veterinary Practitioners may be able to assist with advice and information to their clients on strategies being employed to combat a notifiable disease outbreak. Co-ordination through the British Veterinary Association, British Small Animals Veterinary Association and British Equine Veterinary Association should be considered.

Local Veterinary Practitioners may also be able to provide useful knowledge to KCC and/or Medway Council about the location of any unregistered animals. Such information could be pertinent if the disease outbreak affected animals currently unregistered, such as poultry.

Amenity Societies and Groups

Amenity societies and groups such as the National Trust, Kent Downs and High Weald AONB Units, Business Link, Woodland Trust, can also assist KCC and/or Medway Council in evaluating the ongoing impact of an animal or plant disease outbreak, and contribute to the recovery strategy.

Animal Welfare and Wildlife Conservation Groups

The RSPCA, RSPB, British Trust for Ornithology, Kent Wildlife Trust, Kent Field Club, Buglife, Plantlife, Kent Field Club and other specialist groups may provide assistance and advice.

Charities and Voluntary Sector

The Kent Voluntary Sector Emergency Group and Kent Resilience Team provide the link to this sector.

5. Alerting

Alerts to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents may be received by KCC and/or Medway Council from a range of partners, including:

- Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)
- Food and Environment Research Agency (Fera)
- Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO)
- Ports and Port Health Authorities
- Local veterinary practices
- Forestry Commission

- Kent and Medway Biological Records Centre
- Local or national media outlets
- Members of the public

For Kent County Council all alerts must be notified directly to:
A. Trading Standards on Call Manager via Contact Point: tel. 03000 414191 (24/7); and
B. Duty Emergency Planning Officer: tel. 03000 414 999 (24/7) email: emergency.planning@kent.gov.uk

For Medway Council all alerts must be notified directly to:
A. Trading Standards – 07834 374201; and
B. Emergency Planning (Via Medway Control Centre) – 01634 730097 (Independent "Emergencies only" direct access telephone line)

6. Activation

The KCC Trading Standards On-call Manager and Emergency Planning Duty Officer and/or Medway Council, informed by available information, will initiate an expandable response. This may involve a watching brief or mobilisation of some elements of this emergency plan through to the initiation of a major emergency and appropriate Integrated Emergency Management Structures.

7. Response

- At the operational level, the Animal and Plant Health Agency may establish a Local Disease Control Centre in the event of a notifiable animal or plant disease outbreak, headed by the regional operations director. The Local Disease Control Centre co-ordinates and implements the disease control operation to ensure that all the relevant agencies and stakeholders are involved. The Local Disease Control Centre follows tactical direction and policy guidance set out in disease control strategies. The Local Disease Control Centre, if established, will inform the local multi-agency response.

- The principal mechanism for local multi-agency response is Kent Resilience Forum. This body brings together resilience partners for the purpose of facilitating co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act. A flexible application of integrated emergency management principles will be used to manage animal and plant disease outbreaks in Kent and Medway (please see Fig. 1).

- In the event of an animal or plant disease outbreak, KCC, and/or Medway Council and partners will be bound by the following broad principles:

- Protect the health and safety of the public and those directly involved in controlling the outbreak;
- Protect animal welfare, biodiversity and the wider environment;
- Minimise the wider economic impact of the outbreak; and
- Control and slow the spread and eradicate the disease to regain a disease-free status.

- **Strategic Co-ordinating Group for Animal or Plant Health Emergency**

  The Strategic Co-ordinating Group will lead the multi-agency response and recovery to animal or plant health emergencies in the county and will:

  - Determine strategic aims and objectives - review regularly;
  - Establish policy framework for the overall management of the situation;
  - Prioritise requirements of the tactical tier and allocate personnel and resources;
  - Formulate and implement media-handling and public communication plans, delegate to one agency; and
  - Direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response in order to facilitate the recovery process.

- **Integrated Emergency Management – Animal Health Key Issues**

  The following issues should be considered when responding to an animal health emergency impacting the county:

  - Ensure effective liaison across KCC and/or Medway Council and wider partners, to support strategic, tactical and operational elements of the response;
  - Enforcing movement restrictions and controls;
  - Working with the APHA, including tracing and issuing movement licences if required;
  - Cleansing and disinfection;
  - Animal Health and Welfare Management and Enforcement System (AMES) data inputting; and
  - Communication with key stakeholders.

- **Integrated Emergency Management – Plant Health Key Issues**

  The following issues should be considered when responding to a plant health emergency impacting the county:

  - Mobilise and provide support within an Integrated Emergency Management structure; and
  - Ensure effective liaison across KCC and/or Medway Council and with resilience partners, to support strategic, tactical and operational elements of the response;
  - Working with the APHA, Fera and/or the Forestry Commission, including tracing and issuing movement licences if required;
  - Bio-security interventions; and
  - Communication with key stakeholders.

Figure 1: sets out a model integrated emergency management structure for animal and plant health emergencies in Kent. Please note that flexibility may be exercised in relation to detail of the structure dependent upon specific characteristics of the outbreak.



8. Stand Down

The outbreak stand down will only commence upon notification from Defra and/or APHA. This will only be considered after there has been an appropriate period following the last positive disease confirmation, and upon consideration of scientific advice.

9. Debrief

Following any significant animal or plan disease outbreak response the KCC and/or Medway Council must ensure that formal internal and multi-agency Debriefs are undertaken in a timely manner, and while experiences and learning remain vivid. A core component of the Debrief process should be to review the effectiveness of this Plan.

Debriefs undertaken as part of relevant resilience exercises should also inform the future evolution and development of this Plan.

For any animal and plant health disease outbreak affecting the KCC and/or Medway Council administrative area the Council(s) will nominate the Debrief chair and secretary and accept overall responsibility for drafting the report and implementation of any recommendations. The KRF Structured Debrief Report template should be used as the basis for the report. A model Debrief agenda can be found at Annex L.

10. Recovery

KCC and/or Medway Council will lead the recovery phase, with planning for initiation undertaken by the Recovery Advisory Group. The following table sets out a model framework for the Recovery phase for an animal or plant health emergency:



11. Training and Exercises

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Regulations require "Category 1 Responders" to include provision for training and exercises in their emergency plans.

Regular training and exercise events will raise staff awareness of potential risks and provide an understanding and confidence in emergency response and recovery procedures.

Training and Exercising (April 2016 – present day)

Organiser	Title of Training / Exercise	Type	Date
KCC	Exercise White Raven (Foot and Mouth disease)	Live / Table-top	13th September 2016
KCC	KCC Animal and Plant Health	e-Learning	Launched August 2017
KCC / Defra / Forest Research / CCRI / FERA	Resilient Treescapes – Defra Tree Health Workshop – European Union Withdrawal Policy Development	Workshop	21st January 2019
KCC	Exercise Lundy 2.0 Transit / Resting Fields	Workshop	11th September 2019

12. Horizon Scanning

Emerging International Animal and Plant Health Issues

Good intelligence and early warning can be key to enabling proactive identification of risks and grasping opportunities for prevention in relation to emerging overseas animal and plant health issues. Greater understanding of the epidemiology of overseas pests and pathogen outbreaks can also enhance biosecurity policy and practice and reduce the risk of expansion into the UK. Effective preventive biosecurity interventions and constructive decision making are all informed by a global outlook in terms of potential future threats. Future political, environmental, technological, and societal changes will have multiple implications for animal and plant health, potentially affecting food security, food safety, national economies, biological diversity, and the wider environment (Defra).

The most recent global assessment, 'A 2018 Horizon Scan of Emerging Issues for Global Conservation and Biological Diversity' (Sutherland et al., 2017), is intended as an early awareness and alert system, drawing attention to novel issues that, if realised, may create pivotal opportunities or threats, and thus warrant further analysis in the near future. This annual publication supports the capabilities of authorities, organizations and/or agencies to deal better with an uncertain and complex future.

Border checks on high-risk imports provide a key biosecurity safeguard in terms of preventing potentially harmful organisms entering Kent and the rest of the UK. Kent Resilience Forum partners assume a proactive stance through their active engagement with border issues and risk assessment.

Link to 2018 publication: https://www.cell.com/trends/ecology-evolution/fulltext/S0169-5347(17)30289-6

Climate Change Impacts

Projections from global climate models indicate that the frequency of extreme weather events will increase as the planet warms. Such impacts include:

- Increasing average atmospheric temperatures causing generally drier summers and more frequent drought conditions (particularly in the south east) as well as wetter and milder winters;
- Decreasing number of frost days;
- Increasing frequency and intensity of rainfall events;
- Rising sea level (which, in relative terms, is predicted to be greater in the south east of England); and
- Increasing storm events, resulting in escalating coastal storm surges and an elevated risk of tidal/coastal flooding events.

However, it must be noted that the UK has always been subject to long-term weather variability, which will continue across all Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) potential future emission scenarios.

Such direct changes, for example, increasing average temperatures and decreasing frost, allow for invasive/alien species (particularly invertebrates) to modify their distribution/range and expand into new areas. Exeter and Oxford Universities have found that species with the potential to become crop pests are moving at an average of 3km a year towards the northern and southern latitudes. Extreme weather events can result in stresses to native species which can become more physiologically vulnerable to secondary-pests and pathogens e.g. susceptibility of trees to attack by leaf eating and bark-boring invertebrates and endophyte fungi increased as environmental stresses mount and impair effectiveness of natural defences. Further, several studies found an association between a drought during the previous year and West Nile virus incidence. The non-native mosquito vectors of dengue and

chikungunya virus are adapted to exploit aquatic habitats created as a response to drought (e.g. water troughs, irrigation ponds and storage containers). Milder winters also work to reduce the periods of dormancy and increase survival rates of many pests and pathogens. For example, incidence of the zoonotic Lyme disease is already increasing at northern latitudes where the active period of its tick vector is lengthening. The recruitment of new pests and pathogens can also increase under such conditions.

Forecast increasingly wet and warm winters and more intense rainfall events in summer will result in the humid environments favoured by many bacterial and fungal pathogens, increasing the opportunity for them to gain footholds in the UK, increase populations and expand range. For example, Leptospirosis, a zoonotic bacterial disease which can be carried by wild and domestic mammals, is expected to occur with increasing frequency and greater intensity as storms, flooding and high humidity events become more common.

Such climatic changes can also affect the phenology and synchronisation of pest/pathogen controlling predators as well as, indirectly, the biology of pests/pathogens as they adapt to changing climatic conditions, potentially influencing length of breeding cycles, foraging times, food availability and overwintering success.

Kent County Council recognises the UK Environment and Climate Emergency and will continue to commit resources and align its policies to address this. Animal and plant health considerations are central to this agenda.

Ecological Decline Impacts

Naturally occurring pests and pathogens play a crucial role within the functioning of natural ecosystems and are in balance with their hosts and predators maintaining a long-established equilibrium. However, when natural ecological processes are drastically altered, pest and disease species can become out of balance and inflict unsustainable levels of damage upon host species.

Habitat loss and degradation is impacting a range of species with significant roles in the maintenance of healthy ecosystems.

Changes in land cover, such as deforestation or desertification, alters ecosystem dynamics, changing the proximity and interactions between wildlife and livestock and can cause both plants and animals to become increasingly vulnerable to pests and diseases. Land use change can also increase the spread and emergence of zoonotic, vector-borne diseases as wildlife are forced to modify their ranges.

Climate and ecology link all life on this planet, including relationships between pests, pathogens, hosts and the natural control mechanisms. When dynamics change and systems become unbalanced, health risks and vulnerability are increased and the ability to recover is reduced. Mitigating the negative anthropogenic impacts on ecology

and climate as well as restoring ecosystem services and natural process provides a cost-effective natural preventative measure against animal and plant heath emergencies.

Kent County Council recognises the UK Environment and Climate Emergency and will continue to commit resources and align its policies to address this. Animal and plant health considerations are central to this agenda.

EU Withdrawal

Advice on animal and plant health issues in relation to the UK's withdrawal from the European Union:

- Guidance on importing animals, animal products and high-risk food and feed not of animal origin in the case of a no-deal EU exit: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/importing-animals-animal-products-and-high-risk-food-and-feed-not-of-animal-origin-if-the-UK-leaves-the-EU-with-no-deal

- Guidance on importing and exporting plants and plant products in the case of a no-deal EU exit: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/importing-and-exporting-plants-and-plant-products-if-theres-no-withdrawal-deal

- EU rules on the importation of plants and plant products from non-EU countries: https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_health_biosecurity_en

- EU rules on the importation of live animals from non-EU countries: https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/live_animals_en

- EU rules on animal health and welfare in relation to movement, transporter authorisation and slaughterhouse operations from non-EU countries: https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare_en

- EU rules on the use of veterinary medicine and medicated feeds: https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/health/veterinary-medicines-and-medicated-feed_en

- Statutory instruments relating to animal health under the EU Withdrawal Act (2018): https://www.gov.uk/eu-withdrawal-act-2018-statutory-instruments?parent=&keywords=animal&laid_date%5Bfrom%5D=&laid_date%5Bto%5D=

- Statutory instruments relating to plant health under the EU Withdrawal Act (2018): https://www.gov.uk/eu-withdrawal-act-2018-statutory-instruments?parent=&keywords=plant&laid_date%5Bfrom%5D=&laid_date%5Bto%5D=

- European Medicines Agency guidance on EU exit: https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/about-us/united-kingdoms-withdrawal-european-union-brexit
- National Office of Animal Health guidance on EU exit: https://www.noah.co.uk/focus-areas/brexit/

- British Veterinary Association guidance on EU exit: https://www.bva.co.uk/news-campaigns-and-policy/policy/future-of-the-profession/brexit/

- European Food Safety Authority guidance on EU exit: https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit/brexit-preparedness/preparedness-notices_en#sante

APPENDIX A Partner Agencies Roles & Responsibilities

APHA	• Lead the response to eradicate any outbreaks of exotic notifiable animal disease at a national and local level • Alert the upper-tier Local Authority to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • Leading on identifying tracing of the disease source(s) and spread • Notify the commencement of the outbreak stand-down • On scene during an incident • Leading the local disease operation including managing the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) and any Forward Operations Bases (FOBs) • Liaise with upper-tier Local Authority throughout the process • Provide significant input into decisions made at a strategic level and ensure effective communication occurs across Government and delivery partners, including the co-ordination of the tactical level response at the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) • Representation at strategic and tactical co-ordination centers to assist response and recovery decision making and to give operational advice and support • Engagement in Tactical Daily Communications Meeting, providing briefings to all partners • Involvement with press conferences • Advice regarding legislation relevant to animal welfare • Ensure suspect site inspections takes place where samples may be taken by the APHA for testing purposes • Co-ordinating the serving of notices and movement licenses • Notifying KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards of any suspect premises where samples have been sent for testing • Give advice regarding movement of livestock and other animals as required and use powers to ensure transporters are following the rules • Tracing and issuing movement licenses (Animal Transport Certificate) if required

	• Tracing movements of animals in conjunction with KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards • Delivery of enforcement role in partnership with KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards • Provide guidance to KCC and/or Medway Council prior to the issuing of notices or signage • Maintenance of pre-determined strategic grazing locations, contingency premises and equipment stores close to the Port of Dover and/or major transport hubs • Provide advice/support lines to farmers and others regarding the welfare of livestock and other animal welfare matters • Communication with local stakeholders and operational partners to ensure awareness of responsibilities in a disease situation • Work with the British Horse Society in support of equine welfare
Ashford Livestock Market	• Provision of lairage facilities (sheep only) • Halting the movement of livestock out of the market if required • Informing transporters not to travel to the market if required
Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers	• Alerting KCC and/or Medway Council of notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • Supporting Defra and APHA with the dissemination of key operational information to animal health and welfare officers at KCC and/or Medway Council
Borough & District Councils	• Engage with appropriate multi-agency liaison in discussion with PHE, KCC and/or Medway Council and other appropriate stakeholders to ensure informed conversations take place on next steps. • Co-ordination of media communications in co-operation with PHE, KCC and/or Medway Council and NHS • Engagement with the LAAHF and other relevant internal teams if an inter-authority working arrangement is in place • Participation in creation of cross border warrant authorisation agreements with neighbouring authorities to enable mutual aid during an outbreak situation • Keeping records of licensed and unlicensed animal establishments within their area
British Horse Society	• Representing businesses affected by a notifiable disease outbreak • Work with the Defra in support of equine welfare
British Trust for Ornithology	• Provision of specialist ornithological advice and assistance

British Veterinary Association	• Alerting KCC and/or Medway Council to notifiable and non-notifiable animal health incidents • Liaison with APHA to report concerns about the disease status of a premise • Co-ordination with partners in the case of a notifiable disease outbreak • Provision of expert knowledge to KCC and/or Medway Council about the location of any unregistered animals • Assisting with advice and information to the public
Buglife	• Provision of specialist entomological advice and assistance, encompassing policy research and development and horizon scanning
Defra	• Operational lead for co-ordination, preparing for managing, controlling and response to outbreaks and incidents of notifiable diseases of animals and plants • Joint lead responsibility (with Forestry Commission) on plant health • Overall accountability for dealing with any suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak • Establishment of structures and policies required to eradicate disease as outlined in national contingency plans • Forward liaison at scene during an incident • Establishment of Vaccination Zones and Vaccination Surveillance Zones • Informing decision making relating to the closure or restricted access of Local Authority public rights of way • Instigate notification to stand down • Provision of information on response and recovery funding for KCC and/or Medway Council • Representation at strategic and tactical co-ordination centers to assist decision making • Participation and briefing to all partners in Tactical Daily Communications Meeting • Provide operational advice and support • Press team representation within media briefing and involvement with press conferences • Provision of advice/support to farmers and others regarding the welfare of livestock and other animal welfare matters • Advice regarding legislation relevant to animal welfare • Provision of up-to-date information via Defra webpage • Provision of advice regarding movement of livestock and other animals as required • Collation of information on animal transporters caught breaking the law nationally and abroad • Ability to grant, suspend or cancel animal transporter authorisation

	• Provide guidance to KCC and/or Medway Council on the issuing of notices or signage • Work with the British Horse Society in support of equine welfare
Environment Agency	• Regulatory role for certain waste management and disposal activities (disposal of carcasses, animal by-products, manure and wash-waters) • Monitoring and management of the environmental impacts of a notifiable disease • Provision of expert advice, including on pollution prevention and control measures
Euro Tunnel	• Alerting KCC to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • As a carrier of plants & animals, especially horses, co-operation with all partners is required (e.g. restriction on movement of animals)
Food Standards Agency	• Involvement in initial identification of suspicion of exotic notifiable animal disease during routine ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections • Co-ordination with partners during a suspected or confirmed outbreak to provide relevant support with regards to food safety and hygiene and protecting the overall 'farm to fork' production process • Attendance at the NDCC to provide input on any potential risks to consumers • Designation of slaughterhouses and, as necessary, cutting plants etc. to handled restricted meat and implement enhanced checks
Forest Research	• Provision of specialist tree health advice and assistance, policy research and development including horizon scanning
Forestry Commission	• Shared lead (with Defra) responsibility for the protection of forestry and timber products • Alerting KCC and/or Medway Council to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • Co-operation with partners on the tracing and issuing movement licenses
Kent and Medway Biological Records Centre	• Alerting KCC and/or Medway Council to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant pest and pathogen records • Mapping distribution and trend analysis in relation to pests and pathogens • Maintaining local records and data resources for non-native mosquitoes and other potentially harmful organisms
Kent Downs AONB	• Provide assistance in the evaluation of ongoing impacts of notifiable disease outbreaks • Contribution to the recovery strategy
Kent Field Club	• Provision of scientific advice and assistance, research and development including horizon scanning and early warning interventions

Kent Fire and Rescue	• Co-operation with PHE and LDCC to address the public health needs involved in responding to a disease outbreak as part of the LRF • Uphold contingencies and biosecurity measures when working within suspect premises and/or land holdings
Kent Police	• Co-operation with APHA and KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards' as enforcement (e.g. pro-active police patrols) • Enforcement of movement restrictions in co-operation with KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards • Provision of intelligence and detailed planning during response • Exchange of intelligence between partners
Kent Showground	• Host resting fields for animals in transit as part of a pre-agreed contractual arrangement
Kent Wildlife Trust	• Representation at strategic and tactical co-ordination centers to assist decision making as required • Provision of assistance and scientific advice as required • Assist with feeding, shelter, penning and the security of livestock, including conservation grazing stock, during an incident
Medway Council	• Engagement with Defra, APHA, PHE, KCC and other partners • Engagement with the LAAHF and other relevant internal teams if an inter-authority working arrangement is in place • Co-ordination of media communications in co-operation with PHE, KCC and NHS • Participation in creation of cross border warrant authorisation agreements with neighbouring authorities to enable mutual aid during an outbreak situation • Keeping records of licensed and unlicensed animal establishments within their area
Natural England	• Provision of advice and assistance, particularly upon the impacts of a notifiable disease outbreak on landscape, wildlife and protected species
NFU	• Representation at strategic and tactical co-ordination centres to assist with decision making • Provide expertise around the requirements and needs of farmers in an emergency • Disseminate important information to NFU members as required • Represent businesses affected by an animal or plant disease outbreak
NHS	• Liaison with PHE on the impact of zoonotic disease on public health • Co-operation with press team, representation within media briefings and involvement with press conferences

	• Participation in multi-agency KRF Invasive and Non-native Mosquito Task Group briefing teleconferences if mobilised in the event of invasive non-native mosquito species incident
Plantlife	• Provision of specialist botanical advice and assistance, policy research and development including horizon scanning
Port of Dover	• Alerting KCC to notifiable and non-notifiable animal or plant health incidents • As a carrier of plants & animals, especially horses, co-operation with all partners is required (e.g. restriction on movement of animals)
Public Health England	• Act as lead for public health response • Trigger stand up of PHE internal incident control structures to co-ordinate human health risk assessments • Co-operation with partners to address the public health needs involved in responding to a notifiable disease outbreak • Assess the impact of zoonotic disease on public health and provide health protection expertise and advice to the public and partners • Involvement with the KRF response • Provision of specialist advice to responding agencies (including scientific, laboratory and epidemiological support) • Attendance at the NDCC at a national level and the LDCC at a local level • Continued research and sampling of population dynamics and seasonality of exotic mosquitoes at key habitats and across regions
RSPB	• Representation at strategic and tactical commands to assist decision making as required • Provision of assistance and scientific advice
RSPCA	• Provision of assistance and scientific advice as required • Provision of RSPCA 24-hour help line • Invoke National Crisis Response including the National Control Centre (as required) during the case of evacuations
Woodland Trust	• Assisting KCC and/or Medway Council in evaluating the ongoing impact of a plant disease outbreak and contribute to the recovery strategy as required
Zoo Parks & Other Animal Collections	• Liaison with partners on biosecurity and welfare interventions for exotic animal species

APPENDIX B Resting Fields for Animals in Transit

Introduction

Kent's is a key trading gateway between the UK and Continental Europe, with the shortest sailing times to and from the Continent. Livestock, including Equidae, are shipped by carriers operating out of both Port of Dover and Ramsgate. Eurotunnel provides the only fixed link to the Continent and Le Shuttle transports domestic Equidae on its single deck shuttles.

The potential for unforeseen disruption and delay to Channel transport therefore means that animal welfare and associated biosecurity considerations must receive a high priority. Additionally, the domestic movement of livestock may be impacted by any road network disruption, particularly to Ashford Livestock Market, the largest livestock market in the south east (see Annex B). Resting fields comprise pre-identified strategically located and appropriately equipped grazing land where livestock can be turned-out in the event of any prolonged or indeterminate delays or under certain circumstances extreme weather conditions.

A sequential approach is practised in Kent, whereby the first preference is that livestock are not put on the road in the first place if there is a significant risk of delay, the second is that if practicable animals are returned to their place of origin, only where these options are untenable will the resting field option be utilised.

Legislation

European Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations sets out minimum standards for the welfare of animals during transport. The Regulation applies to the transport of all live vertebrate animals for the purposes of economic activity i.e. a business or trade and is implemented in England by The Welfare of Animals (Transport) (England) Order 2006 and by parallel legislation in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland While the EU rules apply to all live, vertebrate animals transported for economic reasons, more stringent elements apply to the transport of farmed livestock. Farmed livestock is made up of cattle; pigs; sheep; goats; domestic Equidae (horses, ponies, donkeys and mules); poultry (domestic fowl, ducks, geese, turkeys, guinea, fowl, quails, pheasants and partridges); and occasionally camelids (alpacas etc.).

Enforcement

The County Council's Trading Standards service has primary responsibility for enforcing the rules to protect animals during transportation in Kent. Veterinary inspectors from the Animal and Plant Health Authority (APHA) also have powers to ensure transporters are following the rules. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) collects information about any transporters caught breaking the law from local authorities, the APHA and authorities abroad. This information is used when deciding whether to grant, suspend or cancel transporter authorisation.

Rules Governing Journey Length and Duration

Welfare during transport rules require all journeys to be logged (date, time, duration etc.). For journeys up to eight hours involving any species of animal as part of an economic activity, you must have an Animal Transport Certificate (ATC). However, if a journey is over eight hours and involves dispatching and exporting farm livestock or unregistered domestic Equidae to another country, a Journey Log is needed instead. Farmers transporting their own animals under 50 kilometres are exempt from ATC requirements.

Journeys Under 65 Kilometres

Animals transported for less than 65 kilometres do not require vehicles or transporters to be approved or for drivers/handlers to hold certificates of competence. However, an ATC is required, and drivers and handlers must be able to evidence relevant training.

Journeys Over 65 Kilometres (Type 1 Authorisation)

If livestock are transported further than 65 kilometres where total journey times are less than eight hours, you must hold a valid transporter authorisation for short journeys and valid certificates of competence for drivers and handlers.

Journeys Over Eight Hours (Type 2 Authorisation)

If a business or commercial enterprise transports livestock for journeys totalling more than eight hours, they must hold a valid transporter authorisation for long journeys, valid certificates of competence for drivers and handlers and valid vehicle/container approval certificates. For certain long journeys, it's also a legal requirement for the vehicle to have satellite navigation and a tracking system. Vehicles used to transport cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and domestic Equidae for export journeys over eight hours or journeys over 12 hours must have special ventilation and temperature monitoring equipment. The functionality of this equipment must include sensors to monitor and record the temperature within the animal compartment (positioned where conditions are likely to be worst), the ability to maintain the temperature within the animal compartment between 5°C and 30°C (+/- 5°C), a warning system to alert the driver if the temperature in the animal compartment reaches the maximum or minimum limit and a ventilation system with a minimum airflow of nominal capacity of 60 cubic meters per hour per kilo Newton of payload that can operate independently of the vehicle engine for at least four hours. Where livestock's journey times will exceed eight hours (defined as a long journey), transporters must have Type 2 transporter authorisation and will need to provide valid vehicle/container approval certificates if required, details of procedures enabling the tracing and recording of movement of road vehicles under their responsibility, to be able to contact the driver at any time and crucially details of contingency plans in the event of an emergency.

Journey Logs

Where cattle, sheep, goats, pigs or unregistered Equidae are being transported to or from another country on journeys over eight hours a Journey Log must be completed - part of which needs to be submitted and approved by the APHA Office (or overseas equivalent) before the journey can begin. The purpose of a Journey Log is to ensure such journeys are properly planned, with the required rest stops along the way, and without exceeding maximum journey times.

Transporting Animals in Extreme Temperatures

The legal obligation to protect livestock from unnecessary suffering includes that caused by extreme temperatures. Animals should have adequate shelter and protection, as defined by the law and the relevant welfare code for that species. Emergency contingency plans must be in place for every journey. Any disruption and delay can quickly become critical in extreme temperatures. High temperature and humidity can pose a major threat to animal welfare, especially when conditions change suddenly. Newly shorn sheep are one of the livestock species most at risk of unnecessary suffering during transportation in cold weather, as well as pigs, which are extremely sensitive to heat stress.

Resting Fields

In the event of a threat to the welfare of animals in transit arising from disruption or delay, especially if extreme hot or cold weather is involved, transporter emergency contingency plans and Trading Standards interventions may require the unloading of animals to resting fields. Resting fields comprise pre-identified strategically located and appropriately equipped grazing land where livestock can be turned-out in the event of any prolonged or indeterminate delays or under certain circumstances extreme weather conditions. The decision to utilise resting fields may be voluntary and/or negotiated or result from an enforcement intervention by KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards. The practical difficulties associated with cattle and, especially, pigs mean that every effort should be made through targeted communications to ensure that animals are not put on the road in the first place if delays are likely or that animal transporters return animals to their place of origin. Sheep and horses are the most frequently transported animals through the Channel ports and are the likeliest to require resting fields in the event of prolonged delays and disruption affecting the county.

Location of Resting Fields

A pragmatic approach is pursued in Kent as regards operation of resting fields to ensure that animal welfare standards are met. Predetermined strategic grazing locations, contingency premises and equipment stores close to the Channel Ports at Dover and major transport hubs are maintained by the APHA. Kent County Council operates an agreement with the County Showground for land to be used to provide resting fields for sheep and horses. Effective containment of livestock through electric fencing and provision of water and potentially field shelters is also required.

Biosecurity and Resting Fields

A precautionary approach must be pursued in relation to resting fields in terms of biosecurity and site remediation following use. However, animal welfare considerations must be the prime consideration with biosecurity accommodated within this context.

APPENDIX C Ashford Livestock Market

Ashford Livestock Market is the southeast's largest auction market, managed by Hobbs Parker Auctioneers LLP. Running every Tuesday and from August to December, every Friday as well, the market sells cattle, sheep and pigs. The premise has capacity for 10,000 sheep or 5,000 sheep and 900 cattle with lairage facilities. Buyers attend from the Eastern, Southern, South Eastern, South Western and the Welsh border counties and will transport the livestock to and from.

Contact Details:

Email: livestock@hobbsparker.co.uk

Telephone: 01233 506246

Address: Ashford Market, Orbital Park, Ashford, Kent TN24 0GN

Website: https://www.hobbsparker.co.uk/auctioneers/livestock-marketing/#gs.gv3he1

Link to contact directory of livestock hauliers in the south east that attend Ashford Market:

https://www.hobbsparker.co.uk/auctioneers/livestock-marketing/livestock-hauliers/#gs.guzxdg

APPENDIX D Infected Premise, Protection and Surveillance Zones

This appendix provides an overview into infected premises and restricted zones.

Suspect Premise

A premise will be considered a suspect premise when a farmer or veterinary professional has contacted the APHA to report concerns about the disease status of that premise. A notice will be verbally issued to the premise owner or keeper declaring the premises to be suspect premises.

The APHA will ensure that where appropriate, a site inspection takes place. Many suspect cases are cleared at this stage, though in some cases samples are taken by the APHA for testing purposes.

However, in some cases the notifiable animal or plant disease is confirmed, and the farm is declared an Infected Premise.

The following requirements are likely to be applied to a Suspect Premise:

- Restrictions upon the movement of susceptible animals or plant material;
- Restrictions upon the movement of items likely to transmit disease, including vehicles;
- Publicising suspect infection;
- Possible restrictions upon movement of people; and
- Increased cleansing and disinfection standards.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards should be made aware by the APHA of any suspect premise where samples have been sent for testing, and, depending upon the circumstances, should consider initiation of the KRF Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan.

Infected Premise

Premises where a notifiable animal or plant disease has been confirmed are known as Infected Premises.

The following restrictions are likely to apply to an Infected Premise:

- Restrictions upon the movement of susceptible animals or plant material;
- Subsequently, all susceptible animals or plants are likely to be destroyed;
- Restrictions upon the movement of items likely to harbour disease, including vehicles;
- Restrictions upon the movement of non-susceptible animals;

- Publicising disease infection;
- Possible restrictions upon movement of people;
- Increased cleansing and disinfection standards; and
- Full information to be provided to the APHA in relation to all livestock movements or plant material on and off the Infected Premise.

Contact Premise or Dangerous Contacts

It is likely that all farming premises directly adjacent to the Infected Premise will be named as contact premises. Such premises would undoubtedly fall into the protection zone, and therefore these restrictions would also apply. However, it is likely that the APHA would prioritise inspections and samples from these premises.

The APHA, in conjunction with KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards, may begin tracing movements of animals and subsequently discover other Contact Premises. These may not be in the immediate geographic location of the Infected Premise, and therefore would be put under the same restrictions as a Suspect Premise until further testing had been completed.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards may assist with the tracing of livestock movements in relation to the Infected Premise, however this must be restricted to office-based assistance. KCC and/or Medway Council employees should not visit Contact Premises or Dangerous Contacts as this should always be carried out by the APHA.

Temporary Control Zone

Following notification or detection of disease or suspected disease in any part of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State may declare a temporary control zone around the suspect or contact premises of a size appropriate to prevent the spread of disease. The restrictions placed on premises within a Temporary Control Zone will be in line with those applied to the Suspect Premise.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards are responsible for enforcing the requirements within a Temporary Control Zone, however, such a zone will only be in place for a limited period and KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards pro-active work is likely to be restricted until formal declaration of a Protection Zone and Surveillance Zone.

Protection Zone

A Protection Zone, itself contained within a Surveillance Zone, will normally extend to a minimum radius of three kilometres around an infected premise. The three-kilometre radius of the Protection Zone may be extended according to a risk assessment. A range of restrictions can be applied within a Protection Zone, depending upon the type of disease and the nature of the outbreak.

Full details of the restrictions will be provided within the appropriate legislation, however, areas considered may include record keeping, movement of animals, stray animals, wild animals in or around the premise, controlling domestic animals, restrictions in relation to animal products and animal by-products and restrictions upon animal gatherings, increased cleansing and disinfection requirements, movement of vehicles and other things likely to spread disease and possible restrictions on people gathering.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards are responsible for enforcing restrictions within a Protection Zone.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards' enforcement role will be delivered in partnership with the APHA and Kent Police, and is likely to involve pro-active patrols with police officers. Intelligence and detailed planning will also be vital to an effective response.

KCC and/or Medway Council are also required to erect appropriate warning and public information signs around the Protection Zone.

Surveillance Zone

A Surveillance Zone will normally extend to a minimum radius of ten kilometres around an infected premise. The ten-kilometre radius may be extended according to the risk assessment.

A range of restrictions can be applied within a Surveillance Zone, depending upon the type of disease and the nature of the outbreak.

Full details of the restrictions will be provided within the appropriate legislation; however, the following areas will be considered:

- Record keeping;
- Movements of all animals or plant material;
- Stray animals;
- Wild animals in or around the premise;
- Controlling domestic animals;
- Restrictions in relation to animal products and animal by-products;
- Restrictions upon animal gatherings;

- Increased cleansing and disinfection requirements; and
- Movement of vehicles and other things likely to spread disease.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards are responsible for enforcing the restrictions within a Surveillance Zone.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards enforcement role will be fulfilled in partnership with the APHA and Kent Police, and is likely to involve proactive patrols with police officers. Intelligence will also be vital.

KCC and/or Medway Council are also required to erect appropriate warning and public information signs around the Surveillance Zone.

Restricted Zone

The Secretary of State may declare an area a Restricted Zone.

This is an additional measure that can be put in place where scientific advice suggests that increased restrictions outside the immediate Protection Zone and Surveillance Zone are required.

The conditions that apply within the Restricted Zone are unlikely to be as extensive as those within the Protection Zone and Surveillance Zone and will probably be introduced to increase controls relating to the movement of susceptible species.

Vaccination Surveillance Zone

Vaccination Zones may be established by Defra as a control mechanism in some disease situations. In this event, Vaccination Surveillance Zones, where non-vaccinated animals would be monitored to detect disease, would be declared to a radius of not less than 10 kilometres surrounding the Vaccination Zone.

KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards and Kent Police may be required to enforce movement restrictions within these areas in a similar way to Protection Zones and Surveillance Zones.

Again, successful partnership work and work with the APHA and Kent Police would be key to effective KCC and/or Medway Council Trading Standards enforcement. Exchange of intelligence between partners will be vital.

APPENDIX E Notifiable Animal Disease List (and Links)

- African horse sickness: how to spot and report the disease
- African swine fever: how to spot and report the disease
- Anthrax: how to spot and report the disease
- Aujeszky's disease: how to spot and report it
- Avian influenza (bird flu)
- BSE: how to spot and report the disease
- Bluetongue: how to spot and report the disease
- Bovine TB: how to spot and report the disease
- Brucellosis: how to spot and report the disease
- Chronic wasting disease: how to spot and report the disease
- Classical swine fever: how to spot and report the disease
- Contagious agalactia: how to spot and report the disease
- Contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia: how to spot and report it
- Contagious epididymitis: how to spot and report the disease
- Contagious equine metritis: how to spot and report the disease
- Dourine: how to spot and report the disease
- Enzootic bovine leukosis: how to spot and report the disease
- Epizootic haemorrhagic disease: how to spot and report it
- Epizootic lymphangitis: how to spot and report the disease
- Equine infectious anaemia (swamp fever): how to spot and report it
- Equine viral arteritis: how to spot and report the disease
- Foot and mouth disease: how to spot and report it
- Glanders and farcy: how to spot and report the diseases
- Goat plague: how to spot and report the disease
- Lumpy skin disease: how to spot and report the disease

- Newcastle disease: how to spot and report it
- Paramyxovirus infection: how to spot and report the disease
- Rabies: how to spot and report the disease in animals
- Rabies in bats: how to spot it and report it
- Rift Valley fever: how to spot and report the disease
- Rinderpest: how to spot and report the disease
- Scrapie: how to spot and report the disease
- Sheep and goat pox: how to spot and report the diseases
- Sheep scab: how to spot and report the disease
- Swine influenza: how to spot the disease in humans and report it
- Swine vesicular disease: how to spot and report it
- Teschen disease: how to spot and report it
- Vesicular stomatitis: how to spot and report the disease
- Warble fly: how to spot and report the disease
- West Nile fever: how to spot and report the disease

APPENDIX F Notifiable Plant Disease List (and Links)

Bacteria

- Brown rot of potato
- Fire blight
- Ring rot of potato

Fungi

- Karnal bunt
- Phytophthora kernoviae
- Phytophthora lateralis
- Phytophthora ramorum and kernoviae
- Potato wart disease
- Strawberry black spot

Virus/Viroids

- Plum pox

APPENDIX G Notifiable Invertebrate Species List

Coleoptera

- Asian longhorn beetle *Anoplophora glabripennis*
- Argentine stem weevil *Listronotus bonariensis (Kuschel)*
- Red-necked longhorn beetle *Aromia bungii*
- Citrus Long-horned Beetle *Anoplophora chinensis*
- Colorado beetle *Leptinotarsa decemlineata*
- Spotted cucumber beetle *Diabrotica undecimpunctata howardi*
- Lemon Tree Borer *Oemona hirta*
- Pepper Weevil *Anthonomus eugenii*
- Potato Flea Beetle *Psylliodes affinis*
- Red Palm Weevil *Rhynchophorus ferruginrus*

Hemiptera

- Silverleaf whitefly *Bemisia tabaci*
- Sycamore Lace Bug *Corythucha ciliata*
- Banded-winged whitefly *Trialeurodes abutiloneus*
- Wheat weevil *Sitophilus granarius*
- Japanese fruit scale *Pseudaulacaspis pentagona*

Lepidoptera

- Eggplant Fruit Borer *Leucinodes orbonalis*
- Palm Borer *Paysandisia archon*
- Omnivorous leafroller *Platynota stultana*
- South American Tomato Moth *Tuta absoluta*
- *Spodoptera* species
- Tomato Pinworm *Keiferia lycopersicella*

Diptera

- Leaf miners *Liriomyza*

Thysanoptera

- Oriental thrips *Thrips palmi*

Acari

- Fuchsia Gall Mite *Aculops fuchsiae*
- Goji Gall Mite *Aceria kuko*
- Bald Cypress Rust Mite *Epitrimerus taxodii*

Mollusca

- Apple Snails *Pomacea species*

Nematodes

- Potato Cyst Nematodes *Globodera rostochiensis*
- Stem nematode on Narcissus and Tulip *Ditylenchus dipsaci*

APPENDIX H Non-native Mosquito Species and Associated Pathogens

Introduction

There are 34 native and naturalised mosquito species known to be resident in the UK, the females of a number of these feed on avian and mammalian blood. However, mosquitoes (particularly males) are also nectar feeders, acting as important pollinators, while in their aquatic larval stage they are filter feeders - removing significant quantities of organic matter and therefore improving water quality. Mosquitoes are also a key food source for other invertebrates, birds and small mammals.

Mosquitos are themselves harmless to humans, however they can be vectors of a number of potentially very harmful diseases. In top priority is to carefully manage and control any disease that may be vectored by mosquitoes, paying particular attention to vaccination and minimising contact between infected, or potentially infected, individuals and any mosquitoes. Effective disease control keeps the vectors harmless.

Risk management and planning for potential invasive mosquitos and potential vectored diseases is managed by Public Health England (PHE).

The Anopheles mosquito (*Anopheles maculipennis*), which is native to Kent, acted as the historic vector for most malaria transmission within Europe. However, improved medical care and treatments have seen malaria eradicated from the UK and the rest of Europe, and reservoirs of the pathogen therefore no longer exist within Anopheles populations. Sporadic locally acquired malaria cases are still reported in Europe, related to either transmission by a local Anopheles mosquito infected by a returning traveller with malaria (i.e. ‘introduced malaria’) or by an infected mosquito transported by aircraft from a malaria-endemic country (i.e. ‘airport malaria’).

In addition to our long-established native mosquitoes, new species are increasingly reaching the UK through accidental introductions associated with freight and passenger transport, and as a result of expansions in their ranges as the UK’s climate warms. Five species are currently recognised as naturalised. Kent’s significance for trans-national trade and passenger transport and its geographical proximity to continental Europe places the county in the frontline of this changing ecology.

Non-native Mosquito Species

There are some 3,500 known mosquito species worldwide. However, relatively few mosquito species are known vectors for disease. For example, only some 30 to 40 species of the 260 which make up the genus Anopheles have been confirmed as transmitting malaria. There is also variation within individual species, with certain

strains having an immune response which kills the parasite after it has invaded the Anopheles mosquito. Other species from a range of mosquito genera (i.e. *Aedes, Culex, Culiseta, Haemagogus and Ochleratus*) can act as vectors for other pathogens, but not human malaria.

The following 'watch list' provides brief descriptions for those non-native mosquito species which are known disease vectors and have the potential to extend their ranges into the UK. This list is far from exhaustive and ongoing vigilance and information sharing is required in relation to identification and achievement of greater understanding of the ecology of other non-native mosquito species which could also pose a future pathogen vector threat in the UK.

Asian Tiger or Forest Mosquito Aedes albopictus (*Stegomyia albopicta*) – This striking species, characterised by white bands on its legs and body, is native to Southeast Asia but has expanded its range to all continents as a result of accidental introduction by man. The Asian tiger mosquito is now present across much of southern Europe and there exist a small number of records for Kent, though it is not known whether this tropical species can overwinter in the UK. The primary potential route for this insect to reach Kent is by stowing away within the cabs or trailers of lorries, or via private cars, vans and caravans all passing through the Channel ports. Lorry stop facilities and service stations do afford opportunities for stowaway Asian tiger mosquito to disembark locally, however, it is likely that the majority of such introductions will continue through to their final destination. Local airports and airfields provide a further possible route into Kent; however, a number of factors combine to make this less likely.

Public health concerns in relation to this species stem from the fact that it is associated with human settlements, because small temporary water bodies such as water butts, receptacles, tyres and paddling pools are favoured for egg laying and larval development. Within semi—natural landscapes water-filled tree hollows and other small temporary water bodies such as wheel ruts and hoof prints will be utilised by the mosquito for breeding. The reduced competition and predator pressure afforded by such small and ephemeral water bodies can provide an advantage in terms of offspring survival rates, especially where rainfall is reliable. Conversely, prolonged dry periods have a significant negative population impact and rainfall is therefore a key determinant of this species global range i.e. it is virtually absent from more arid regions.

Female Asian tiger mosquito will readily bite humans and in some parts of its range can be a vector for viral pathogens including yellow and dengue fevers, chikungunya and potentially the zika virus. Public Health England (PHE) monitor for this species.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems is the key means of reducing the potential for the entry of this species into the UK, especially from those parts of the world where the species acts as a vector for disease. However, it is likely that sporadic outlier populations will continue to establish in Kent and continued

monitoring of population trends and any confirmed overwintering is important. Globally, there is little evidence that response interventions undertaken once breeding populations have become established, such as reducing local egg laying / larval development opportunities and insecticide use, have been successful.

This species can be confused with two of our native mosquito species, the banded mosquito (*Culiseta annulate*) and tree hole mosquito (*Aedes geniculatus*). However, both species are closely associated with woodland and other shaded semi-natural habitats and they are therefore less likely to be found in urban areas than Asian tiger mosquito. It is recommended that expert entomological advice is sought in relation to reports of Asian tiger mosquito to reduce the risk of mistaken identity.

Yellow Fever Mosquito (*Aedes aegypti*) – The yellow fever mosquito is recognizable by white markings on its legs and a pattern in the form of a lyre on the upper surface of its thorax. Its distribution has expanded from its native sub-Saharan African to all continents aided by commercial and tourist traffic. The species is established on Madeira, where it has been implicated in a large outbreak of dengue fever and has also been recorded in the Netherlands and northern England.

As the common name suggests, Aedes aegypti is the primary vector of yellow fever and can also transmit the dengue fever, zika, chikungunya and mayaro viruses. Like the Asian tiger mosquito this species has a strong association with human settlements and also uses small and temporary water bodies for egg laying. Indeed, where both species are present yellow fever mosquito populations have declined as they are outcompeted by the Asian tiger mosquito.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems is the key means of reducing the potential for the entry of this species into the UK, especially from those parts of the world where the species acts as a vector for disease. The primary potential route for this insect to reach Kent is by stowing away within the cabs or trailers of lorries, or via private cars, vans and caravans all passing through the Channel ports. Lorry stop facilities and service stations do afford opportunities for stowaway yellow fever mosquito to disembark locally, however, it is likely that the majority of such introductions will continue through to their final destination. Local airports and airfields provide a further possible route into Kent; however, a number of factors combine to make this less likely.

American Rock Pool Mosquito (*Aedes atropalpus*) – The American Rock Pool Mosquito is a relatively drab animal compared to other Aedes species, with an absence of characteristic markings and a grey-brown colouring. This species is native to eastern North America and is thought to have spread in North America largely via the movement of used tyres. The American rock pool mosquito is a known vector for West Nile fever and La Crosse virus. Individuals and small populations of this mosquito have been historically recorded in association with tyre depots in Italy and France and a population is thought to persist in the Netherlands. Monitoring indicates that the

Netherlands population has shown little spread. However, preliminary modelling shows that climatic conditions in the Netherlands are not a limiting factor for further expansion of this species in Europe.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems, especially in relation to the movement of tyres, is the key means of reducing the potential for the entry of this species into the UK. The ability of eggs of this species to remain viable even if a water body dries-out before hatching aids unintended introductions though adults may also stowaway within vehicles and trailers as is the case with other mosquito species.

East Asian Bush or Rock Pool Mosquito (*Aedes japonicus*) – A rather drab grey-brown mosquito, with a characteristic bronze lyre-shaped pattern on its thorax, which is native to the Honshu island of Japan but now found across North and Central America, most of Asia and parts of Europe, including the Balkans, Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, France and Belgium. This species is associated with woodland and other shady habitats, with the larvae being found in water-filled tree hollows and other similar small water bodies rich in fallen leaves and other organic matter. They overwinter as eggs in cooler regions. Studies indicate that the East Asian bush mosquito is reluctant to bite humans, with the female preferring to feed on the blood of birds, rodents and other small mammals. This species is considered to be a vector of West Nile virus in regions where this disease is present and potentially dengue fever and chikungunya virus.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems is the key means of reducing the potential for entry by this species into the UK, especially from those parts of the world where the species can act as a vector for West Nile virus. However, the proximity of breeding populations of this mosquito in France and Belgium make it likely that the East Asian bush mosquito will eventually expand its range into the UK if it is not already present. The primary potential route for this insect to reach Kent is by stowing away within the cabs or trailers of lorries, or via private cars, vans and caravans all passing through the Channel ports. Lorry stop facilities and service stations do afford opportunities for stowaway East Asian bush mosquitoes to disembark locally, however, it is likely that the majority of such introductions will continue through to their final destination. Local airports and airfields provide a further possible route into Kent; however, a number of factors combine to make this less likely. Its association with woodland habitat and preference for non-human blood meals reduces any threat to human health arising from this exotic mosquito species.

Aedes koreicus – A relatively large mosquito species with white markings on its abdomen at the joints on its legs and grey stripes on the black thorax. Native to north-eastern China, Japan the Russian Far East and Korean peninsula this species has now become established in Belgium, Italy and Germany. Like the Asian tiger mosquito this species is strongly associated with human settlements where eggs are laid in tyres

and other small water-filled man-made habitats. Within semi-natural habitats this mosquito is associated with water-filled tree holes.

Adult female Aedes koreicus will bite humans, a range of wild mammals and livestock by both day and night. This mosquito is a known vector of Japanese encephalitis virus and canine heartworm and is a potential vector of the nematode worm Brugia malayi, which causes lymphatic filariasis, in regions where these pathogens are present.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems is the key means of reducing the potential for entry by this species into the UK, especially from those parts of the world where the species can act as a vector for West Nile virus. However, the proximity of breeding populations of this mosquito in Belgium make it likely that Aedes koreicus will eventually expand its range into the UK (if not already present). The primary potential route for this insect to reach Kent is by stowing away within the cabs or trailers of lorries, or via private cars, vans and caravans all passing through the Channel ports. Lorry stop facilities and service stations do afford opportunities for stowaway East Asian bush mosquitoes to disembark locally, however, it is likely that the majority of such introductions will continue through to their final destination. Local airports and airfields provide a further possible route into Kent; however, a number of factors combine to make this less likely. Its association with woodland habitat and preference for non-human blood meals reduces any threat to human health arising from this exotic mosquito species.

Eastern Tree Hole Mosquito (*Aedes triseriatus*) – A drab grey-brown mosquito native to eastern North America which has been intercepted in France in a shipment of tyres from the United States. The eastern tree hole mosquito is a vector for La Crosse, yellow fever, eastern encephalitis, Venezuelan encephalitis, western encephalitis virus and canine heartworm in regions where these pathogens are present.

Effective biosecurity in terms of trans-national transportation systems, especially in relation to shipments from North America, is the key means of reducing the potential for the entry of this species into the UK. As this mosquito is not thought to be established in Europe entry through stowing away on vehicles and trailers is considered less likely than for the other species highlighted.

Monitoring

Public Health England (PHE) runs the nationwide mosquito surveillance project in collaboration with a range of organisations across the country. PHE also run a network of mosquito traps. By sampling mosquitoes at adult, egg and larval stages PHE aim to understand the population dynamics and seasonality of mosquitoes at key habitats and across regions. Local resources such as the Kent and Medway Biological Records Centre and Kent Field Club also maintain local records for mosquitoes and other invertebrates and can provide a useful data resource.

Alerting

Where PHE monitoring determines the presence of potentially invasive non-native mosquito species local authorities and other stakeholders are alerted and a determination made as to what if any response is required. The 24/7 on-call Duty Emergency Planning Officer will receive early notification of confirmed records for invasive non-native mosquito species and will initiate and facilitate appropriate multi-agency liaison in discussion with PHE, KCC, and/or Medway Council, affected District(s) and other appropriate stakeholders to ensure informed conversations take place on next steps.

Command and Control

KCC Resilience and Emergency Planning Service will establish and resource an early multi-agency **KRF Invasive and Non-native Mosquito Task Group** briefing teleconference involving key stakeholders (e.g. PHE, affected District Councils, KCC, Medway Council, NHS, Animal and Plant Health Agency and specialist entomological advice) to ensure timely, measured and proportionate response and recovery interventions.

Public Communications

Great care must be taken with the content and evidential underpinning of any public communications in relation to invasive non-native mosquitoes to avoid disproportionate and potentially alarming media and social media coverage. PHE, KCC and/or Medway Council, affected District(s) and NHS media professionals will co-ordinate, with appropriate entomological and medical epidemiological advice, all public communications and responses to media approaches and (where necessary) challenge misleading media and social media coverage. The difficulty inherent in lay identification of mosquito species and potential for misidentification of our native species must inform measured and pragmatic public messaging. Key partners such as the Channel ports, lorry parks, freight industry bodies, airports, airfields and freight hubs may require targeted communications strategies

Horizon Scanning

As the planet continues to warm the ranges and populations of invertebrate vectors for human and other animal diseases will continue to change. Increasing temperatures, rainfall and humidity will in a UK context potentially afford optimal conditions for a number of non-native mosquito species. As these insect vectors expand their geographic range, they may expose the UK to new diseases. Increasing international trade and travel, and new trading partners and markets, are all likely to increase the risk of unintentional introductions of a range of non-native species including mosquitoes.

Ecological Considerations for Insecticide and Biological Control use

Our understanding of the effectiveness of response interventions are improving. For example, the University of Southern Mississippi and the Utah State University in the United States have reported on global trends and the practical difficulties inherent in managing mosquito populations, due in part to their growing resistance to insecticides (which is not matched by many of the insects, amphibians and fish species which prey upon them), and direct negative impacts of the insecticides upon their main invertebrate predators. Mosquito predators are longer lived, and their populations are slower to recover and recolonise water bodies.

In addition, broad spectrum insecticides will cause collateral damage to non-target species, harming the environment.

More specific insecticides can avoid the problems of reduced predation rates and collateral environmental harm. At the moment this means using Bacillus thuringiensis serotype israelensis (Bti), a bacterium which infects a small range of fly species. Even this biological control pesticide will not differentiate between native and non-native species and may infect closely related invertebrates, such as chironomid midges and crane flies.

Useful Links

The following links provide further background on non-native mosquito species and associated pathogens:

Distinguishing Aedes albopictus, the Asian tiger mosquito, from native British mosquitoes

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mosquito-surveillance/distinguishing-aedes-albopictus-the-asian-tiger-mosquito-from-native-british-mosquitoes

Qualitative assessment of the risk that West Nile virus presents to the UK human population

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/724377/HAIRS_WNV_risk_assessment.pdf

Rapid risk assessment: Local transmission of dengue fever in France and Spain

https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/rapid-risk-assessment-local-transmission-dengue-fever-france-and-spain

Rapid risk assessment: Multiple reports of locally acquired malaria infections in the EU

https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/rapid-risk-assessment-multiple-reports-locally-acquired-malaria-infections-eu

Aquatic insect predators and mosquito control

https://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/11515/1/11515_Shaalan_%26_Canyon_2009.pdf

Effects of two microbial insecticides on aquatic predators of mosquitoes

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1439-0418.1987.tb00966.x

Effects of Methoprene and Bti on non-target insects

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00006873

Environmental effects of mosquito insecticides on saltmarsh invertebrate fauna

https://www.int-res.com/articles/ab2009/6/b006p077.pdf

APHA review on parasitology horizon scanning:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/parasitology-literature-review-and-horizon-scanning

APPENDIX I Notifiable Animal Disease Suspect Form

DATE: _____ TIME: _____

OFFICER RECEIVING REPORT:

_____

Keep calm and reassure the caller – do not be hurried. Make clear and legible notes.

Section 1: Details of the Informant

NAME:

_____

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

_____

ADDRESS:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

HAS THE CALLER NOTIFIED ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT BODY OR VETERINARY PROFESSIONAL?

_____
_____
_____

Section 2: Details of Suspect Case

NAME OF OWNER OF SUSPECT ANIMAL:

_____

ADDRESS OF OWNER OF SUSPECT ANIMAL:

_____
_____
_____

_____
_____

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

_____

LOCATION OF ANIMAL:

_____
_____
_____
_____

HOLDING NUMBER (IF KNOWN):

_____

SPECIES TYPE:

_____

FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF THE ANIMAL, INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WHERE APPLICABLE:

_____
_____
_____
_____

DISEASE SYMPTOMS:

_____
_____
_____
_____

WHAT SPECIES AND QUANTITIES OF ANIMALS ARE KEPT ON THE SUSPECT PREMISE?

_____
_____
_____
_____

Section 3: Veterinary Information

NAME OF VETERINARY SURGEON:

_____

ADDRESS:

_____

Section 4: Movement Information

HAVE ANY SUSCEPTIBLE SPECIES BEEN MOVED TODAY? YES / NO

PLEASE PROVIDE FULL DETAILS OF THE MOVEMENT, INCLUDING HAULIER INFORMATION WHERE APPROPRIATE

Section 5: Additional Information

ANY OTHER RELEVANT DETAILS:

Section 6: Rabies Information

PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS OF ANY OTHER ANIMALS OR HUMANS THAT HAVE BEEN BITTEN OR SCRATCHED BY THE SUSPECT ANIMAL.

APPENDIX J Equipment List

It is recommended that key KCC and/or Medway Council personnel ensure that they have prompt and ready access to the following Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in anticipation of a notifiable disease outbreak.

Much of the equipment listed is already utilised by animal health and welfare enforcement officers during standard activities. However, KCC and/or Medway Council should review the list to check what additional equipment may be required, and to consider the basic stocking levels that should be maintained in anticipation of a notifiable animal disease outbreak.

Equipment levels and listings should be reviewed on an annual basis at a local level, and in a regional context.

Any additional items of PPE that relates specifically to disease types will be included within the relevant disease annex.

Personal Protective Equipment	**Source, including full supplier details where appropriate.** *(Complete locally)*
Wellington boots or waders	
Overalls (Disposable or capable of being laundered)	
Waterproof suit or coat and leggings	
Disposable gloves	
Hi-visibility jackets or vests	
Eye protection	
Vinyl gloves	
Safety helmet	
Dust masks	
Bio Security	**Source, including full supplier details where appropriate.** *(Complete locally)*
Approved Disinfectants (Suitable for the relevant notifiable disease)	
Buckets	
Scrubbing brush	
Pressure sprayer	
Anti-bacterial soap or wipes	
Paper towels	
General	**Source, including full supplier details where appropriate.** *(Complete locally)*
Identity badge	
Authorisation certificate/warrant	
Camera and film (video camera)	

Torch	
Tape measure	
Rope	
Thermometer	
Marker stick or spray	
Pager / Mobile phone	
Disposable plastic bags (large) with numbered tamper proof seals	
Maps - OS of KCC and/or Medway Council area/road map	
Supply of licences, forms, notices, leaflets, signs, codes etc.	
First aid box	
UV marker pens	
Notebook / pencil / pen	

APPENDIX K Health and Safety

KCC and/or Medway Council should work to carry out a dynamic health and safety risk assessment for any appropriate activities.

KCC and/or Medway Council has in place health and safety risk assessments including risk assessments under COSHH. The following information is intended to act as a reminder of the matters that need to be considered:

Environmental Hazards:

- Handling or inspection of livestock;
- Handling of diseased/suspected animals/carcasses;
- Catching, caging and crating of animals;
- Handling, tending and feeding of impounded animals;
- Slaughter of animals;
- Exposure to excessive noise and vibration;
- Exposure to weather especially sunshine, extreme cold and wet conditions;
- Exposure to dust, moulds and spores; and
- Exposure to violence.

Microbiological and Parasitic Hazards:

- Exposure to zoonosis (diseases transmissible from animals to humans).

Chemical Hazards:

- Use of disinfectants and contact with veterinary products and agrochemicals including pesticides.

It is recommended that KCC and/or Medway Council operational staff at outbreak scenes always carry with them a completed Agriculture Health Carry Card (Ref: IACL 25A) available from HSE publications.

Pre-exposure vaccinations for certain diseases, such as influenza, are available and KCC and/or Medway Council should consider offering these to staff where appropriate.

Individuals should be aware at all times that an incident site is likely to be a hazardous and an imprecise environment and should exercise the same responsibility for health and safety during an incident as they would in the workplace or any other environment.

Each Local Disease Control Centre will have a named safety professional to provide competent advice at all stages of operations.

Operational staff carrying out enforcement duties in the field must be aware that farmers, family members and any other person directly affected by an outbreak of exotic animal disease may suffer from prolonged and intense periods of stress.

Disinfectants – Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Assessment

Operational staff working at outbreak scenes may come into contact with approved disinfectants. Individual KCC and/or Medway Council staff should carry out COSHH assessments for the disinfectants that are to be used (which will vary according to the specific disease) to ensure that all staff, and in particular those staff unfamiliar with the use of disinfectants, are made aware of the associated risks.

First Aid

Operational staff at outbreak scenes should carry with them a basic first aid kit containing guidance on first aid instructions.

APPENDIX L Key Contacts Directory

KCC:

Trading Standards On-Call Manager via Contact Point: tel. 03000 414191 (24/7)

Duty Emergency Planning Officer: tel. 0300 414 999 (24/7)

Medway Council:

Trading Standards On-Call Manager: tel. 07834 374201 (24/7)

Emergency Planning (Via Medway Control Centre) – 01634 730097 (24/7)

Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA):

Telephone: 03000 200 301

Monday to Friday (08:30 – 17:00): 0208 026 0176

Out of Hours Duty Officer: 020 8026 2038

Email: apha.corporatecorrespondence@apha.gov.uk or planthealth.info@apha.gov.uk

Website: www.gov.uk/apha - Twitter: @APHAgovuk - Facebook: aphagov

Note: Callers dialling 03000 200 301 will be offered options to contact the APHA or Rural Payments Agency. After making the initial selection there will be a series of options to direct calls to the appropriate teams within the agencies. Options will include:

Rural Payments Agency options:

- Register or amend customer details;
- Register or amend bank account details;
- Land and mapping; or
- Applications and all other enquiries.

APHA options:

- Suspicion of disease and urgent welfare concerns;
- TB;
- International trade;
- Registration;
- Animal by-products; or
- Other queries.

The helpline will be staffed from Monday to Friday, 8:30am to 5pm. At other times, callers will be given details of the out-of-hours arrangements for reporting suspicion of notifiable disease or urgent animal welfare concerns.

APPENDIX M Model Debrief Agenda

Kent County Council Animal and Plan Disease Model Debrief Agenda

Incident:

Date of Debrief:

Chair:

Secretary:

Present:

1. Introductions and apologies - Chair / All.

2. Background - Chair.

3. Effectiveness of alerting and mobilisation - Team / Agency.

4. Command and control

- What went well? - Team / Agency.
- What went badly? - Team / Agency.

5. Recovery

- What went well? - Team / Agency.
- What went badly? - Team / Agency.

6. Did any best practice emerge during response and/or recovery? - Chair / All.

7. Are changes required to Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan? - Chair / All.

8. Implications for future training and exercising - Chair / All.

9. Run through and refinement of recommendations arising from Debrief - Chair/All.

10. Outline next steps and close meeting – Chair.

APPENDIX N

National Animal Health and Welfare Panel
Compliance through Coordination

ACTSO
Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers

Local Authority Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease Contingency Plan (Kent County Council Version)

This national template was developed by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) and was last reviewed in 2016. It has been specifically developed for local authorities in England and Wales.

Last reviewed: **February 2016**
Version: 004

DOCUMENT HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This document has been produced by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and ACTSO. It is classified as **OFFICIAL when completed** as defined by the Government Security Classifications (April 2014) and may only be disseminated to the approved distribution list as detailed below. If dissemination is required outside this list, please contact ACTSO (admin@actso.org.uk) who produced this document.

Approved distribution list:
All Local Authorities in England and Wales
National Intelligence Team, Regional Intelligence Analysts and Regional Co-ordinators
Consumer Protection Partnership members
Government Departments and other public authorities with enforcement responsibilities
Local Government Association and Welsh Local Government Association.
Local Resilience Forums.

Contents

Annexes

This national template provides guidance which local authorities are encouraged to adopt and personalise by inputting additional localised information into the operational section (Part 2).

* Indicates sections that need to be populated with local information.

In addition to this generic contingency plan, there are a number of disease annexes which contain specific information on how a local authority should respond to a particular disease outbreak:

- African Horse Sickness;
- Foot and Mouth;
- African Swine Fever and Classical Swine Fever;
- Glanders and Farcy;
- Anthrax;
- Rabies;
- Avian Influenza;
- Newcastle Disease;
- Bluetongue;
- West Nile Virus; and
- Equine Infectious Anaemia

Review Log

This national contingency plan template and the supporting disease annexes will be reviewed by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel (NAHWP) and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) on an annual basis in January of each year.

Local authorities should also regularly review their adopted plans to ensure all localised information is correct and up to date.

Version	Date	Amended by	Summary of changes
001	July 2014	-	Original issue – draft template for consultation
002	October 2014	ACTSO	Second draft updated following a consultation during the summer of 2014.
003	February 2015	ACTSO	Third draft with final amendments from Government and the NAHWP + revisions following the AI outbreak in November 2014.
004	February 2016	ACTSO	Annual review. Revisions following outbreaks in 2015, updated contacts and web-links, added new appendices for cross border warrants and outbreak signage.

Distribution List

1. Local authorities should ensure that all relevant internal departments and external partners have access to this exotic notifiable animal disease contingency plan, its supporting disease annexes, and the overarching national contingency plans (GB & NI, England and Wales) as referenced in **Chapter 2 Introduction**.

Please note: Parts of the operational section of this plan should be populated with localised information before this contingency plan is distributed.

2. These contingency plan templates can be accessed by local authority staff via the following websites. N.B. all of these require previous registration / membership.
   - Knowledge Hub – Local Government Animal Health and Welfare Group https://khub.net/group/localgovernmentanimalhealthwelfare

- Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) website – Local authorities must be a subscribed member to gain access to this website www.actso.org.uk.
- ResilienceDirect – an emergency planning online platform. ResilienceDirect's website address is not publicly circulated. If a local authority is not registered for this forum further details can be requested by contacting ResilienceDirect@cabinetoffice.gov.uk.

3. The following list is a suggested network of distribution. Additional organisations/contact details can be added to this list based on local requirements, or to the **Contact List in Annex A**.

Contacts	KCC	Medway Council
Animal Health and Welfare Enforcement	Trading Standards	Trading Standards
Emergency Planning	Duty Emergency Planning Officer	Taff Morgan
Communication and Public Relations	Lucy Mayor	Celia Glynn-Wilcox / Carly Wymark
Highway Services	Simon Jones	Simon Swift
Rights of Way & Access Services	Graham Rusling	
IT (GIS function for mapping)	Neil Barnes / Richard Dadd	Moira Bragg
Financial Services	Wendy Hartley	Phil Watt
Public Health	Andrew Scott-Clark	Alison Barnett
External Contacts		
Local Resilience Forum, which includes Fire and Rescue, NHS, Police	https://www.gov.uk/local-resilience-forums-contact-details	
Animal and Plant Health Agency	https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-andplant-health-agency/about/access-and-opening	
Neighbouring Local Authorities, District, Borough Councils (where applicable)	http://www.kent.gov.uk/about-the-council/how-the-councilworks/district-councils	
Environment Agency / Natural Resources Wales	https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/environmentagency http://naturalresourceswales.gov.uk	
Public Health England / Public Health Wales (Local Office)	https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/publichealth-england http://www.publichealthwales.wales.nhs.uk/	

Part 1: Strategic Section

1. Executive Summary

1. Any outbreak of an exotic notifiable animal disease within the UK has a significant impact on the countries' economy and its ability to trade globally, thus there is a collective need for a multi -agency approach between regulators and industry alike to swiftly and effectively control any such disease outbreak.

2. Local authorities play a key role in disease control, having a statutory responsibility to enforce disease control legislation, and it is with consideration to these roles and responsibilities that this exotic notifiable animal disease contingency plan template has been produced for local authorities in England and Wales. This plan has been drafted by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel[1] and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) following concerns of the changing landscape and animal health risks England and Wales are currently witnessing. With a significant reduction in animal health experience and resource available within local authorities, any failure to have up-to-date contingency plans will leave local authorities ill prepared for a disease outbreak.

3. Notifiable animal disease outbreaks are identified as high risk in accordance with the National Risk Assessment and National Risk Register, as detailed in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. As such, all local authorities in England and Wales are strongly encouraged to read and adopt this contingency plan to ensure consistency across the devolved countries. It is a stark reminder that the overall costs of the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in 2001 to the UK economy were over £8 billion[2] , a cost that would be untenable in the present economic climate.

4. The National Panel and ACTSO gratefully acknowledge and thank the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) for their financial support and the Animal and Plant Health Agency for their expert input into the production of these contingency plans. Grateful acknowledgement is additionally given to Trading Standards South East for their original contributions on which this national contingency plan is based.

5. This contingency plan template will be reviewed on an annual basis by the National Panel. Local authorities are encouraged to regularly review their own adopted plan, which will contain additional localised information, in conjunction with their Local Resilience Forum to ensure readiness and resilience.



Stephanie Young — Former Chair of the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel

Graham Ven — ACTSO Chairman

Statements of Support for these Contingency Plan Templates

[1] The National Animal Health and Welfare Panel consists of lead advisers on animal health drawn from local authorities plus representatives from Defra, the Animal and Plant Health Agency, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland, Food Standards Agency, Rural Payments Agency, Trading Standards Institute, Chartered Institute of Environmental Health.

[2] Anderson Inquiry (2002) 'Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons Learned Inquiry'.

2. Introduction

Aim of this Contingency Plan

1. This contingency plan provides specific information on how and when a local authority should respond to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. It aims to:

- Ensure that local authorities understand their role during a suspect or confirmed outbreak.
- Facilitate a timely, organised and co-ordinated multi agency response.
- Encourage a consistent approach to contingency planning and responding to a disease outbreak across England and Wales, as encouraged by the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel.

Definition of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

2. The term notifiable disease means there is a legal obligation to notify the relevant authority (the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)) if a person suspects disease. Notifiable diseases are named in Section 88 of the Animal Health Act 1981 or an Order made under the Act. A full list of current notifiable diseases and links to disease fact sheets can be found at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/notifiable-diseases-in-animals
A range of information on animal diseases can also be found at:
https://beta.gov.wales/animal-health

3. The term exotic refers to a disease that is not currently present in the UK e.g. foot and mouth disease. Endemic diseases are those which are already present in the UK e.g. bovine tuberculosis.

4. APHA and Defra / the Welsh Government lead on responding to any suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreaks.

5. For information on how to respond to non-notifiable or endemic disease contact the APHA. Contact details for APHA's field services offices can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-and-plant-health-agency/about/accessand-opening

The Local Authority Animal Health Function

6. The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) is the section or department within a local authority which is tasked with the enforcement of disease control measures and as such is a major operational partner in the response to exotic notifiable animal disease outbreaks. The LAAHF is normally situated within the Trading Standards or Environmental Health service of a local authority and would be expected to provide technical advice to its local authority's existing emergency management structure.

7. The LAAHF plays a key role in the implementation of disease control strategies and should provide an informed link between the wider local authority via the Emergency Planning department, the APHA and the Local Resilience Forum (LRF). In a disease outbreak situation, the LAAHF will additionally provide access to local information and technical advice which will be fundamental in responding to control the outbreak.

How to use this Contingency Plan Template

8. This document has a two-tier design. Part 1 is a strategic section to provide relevant guidance to elected members and senior management and Part 2 is an operational contingency plan template for use by officers with animal health and welfare duties. Both sections contain information on preparing for and responding to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak.

9. It is acknowledged that individual local authorities and their animal health functions will vary in terms of size, structure and resource. This national template therefore provides some general guidance which local authorities are encouraged to adopt and personalise by inputting additional localised information into the operational section (Part 2). This will facilitate a timely and more organised response in the event of a disease outbreak. Please refer to the Contents page for further information on which pages can be populated with local information.

10. In addition to this contingency plan, there are a number of supporting disease annexes which contain specific information on how a local authority should respond to a particular disease outbreak. A list of these annexes can be found on the Contents page. Readers should also refer to the documents listed below for further information on the wider multi agency response to exotic notifiable animal disease outbreaks at a national level (Defra / the Welsh Government) or a local level (LRF / local authority). This local authority contingency plan provides a link between these other national and local contingency plans.

    - Great Britain and Northern Ireland Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals
      https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/411162/pb14239-animal-disease-plan-2015.pdf

    - Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals in England
      https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/758789/contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-animals-2018.pdf

    - Welsh Government's Contingency Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases
      https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2019-01/welsh-government-contingency-plan-for-exotic-notifiable-diseases-of-animals-2018.pdf

- LRF and Local Authority's Generic Incident Response Plans. (Some LRFs may also have a specific exotic animal disease response plan). https://www.kent.gov.uk/about-the-council/strategies-and-policies/community-safety-and-crime-policies/emergency-planning

11. This contingency plan has been designed to be used by a range of local authority staff, some of whom may not have a specific background in animal health and welfare. The document contains a number of acronyms so those less familiar with animal health and welfare work should refer to **Annex B Glossary of Terms** when required.

12. It should be noted that there is a range of specific legislation that provides for further powers and duties for local authorities in relation to individual diseases. These have been referenced within each specific disease annex. Example notices have not been included in the disease annexes as they will need to be specifically allocated dependent on the circumstances of each individual outbreak. Further guidance would be issued by Defra / the Welsh Government or APHA before local authorities would be expected to issue notices or signage. A collection of example notices and signs will be stored on ACTSO and the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel's page on ResilienceDirect to try to provide extra assistance to local authorities.

Activation of this Contingency Plan – What to do in an Outbreak

13 Information on how a local authority should respond to an outbreak at an operational level can be found **in Chapter 9 Notification and Activation of this Contingency Plan** and **Chapter 10 Responding to an Outbreak**.

14 To summarise, when the LAAHF initially receives notification of a suspect or confirmed case of exotic notifiable animal disease from the APHA this plan should be activated and the relevant Heads of Service with responsibility for animal health and emergency planning must be informed immediately.

15 15.The LAAHF is strongly encouraged to establish a good working relationship with its internal Emergency Planning department to support each other in preparing for and responding to any such disease outbreak. Emergency Planning should be involved in the adoption of this plan and consulted before this plan is formally activated in a suspect or confirmed disease situation. In addition, a local authority should be part of a wider multi agency approach to respond to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak via the LRF. Refer to **Chapter 4 Multi Agency Response** for more information.

3. Local Authority Key Responsibilities

1. This section highlights a local authority's key responsibilities when responding to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. It should be read in conjunction with **Chapter 10 Responding to an Outbreak**.

2. Overall accountability for dealing with any suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak is the responsibility of the relevant Government department (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for England (Defra) or the Welsh Government) and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA). Throughout this response process, these agencies will uphold a strong focus on confidentiality and will only share information on a need-to-know basis at the point that local authorities or other multi agency partners are required to react. Local authorities will be expected to work with the relevant Resilience and Operational Manager (ROM) and the Readiness and Resilience Manager (RRM) from their APHA field services office. **The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) should not undertake additional tasks and responsibilities in relation to the operational response to a disease situation without the APHA's prior knowledge and instruction**.

3. A key element of any animal disease control strategy is the use of declarations or declaratory orders which are issued by the Secretary of State / Welsh Ministers. Declarations or declaratory orders introduce controls such as movement restrictions and possible footpath closures. It is the role of the LAAHF to enforce the rules within such orders and it is vital that they are quickly received and understood. During the suspicion phase of certain diseases, a temporary control zone may be declared around any premises under suspicion. If disease is confirmed, APHA are likely to impose a protection zone surrounded by a larger surveillance zone. Controls within the protection zone are more stringent than those within the surveillance zone to reflect the increased risk of transmission of disease. The distance of these zones can vary, and local authorities should always seek advice from APHA, although typically a protection zone can be 3km in radius around infected premises and a surveillance zone 10km in radius around infected premises.

4. Some of the key responsibilities for local authorities in responding to a disease outbreak are:
   a) The enforcement of animal disease control rules made under the European Communities Act 1972 and the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended by the 2002 Act). This role is focused on preventing the spread of disease, in conjunction with the APHA. These controls aim to limit the effect on human and animal activities by undertaking tasks such as providing advice on disease control measures, serving restriction notices and undertaking roadside mobile vehicle checks in conjunction with the Police. All of the

above tasks should be done at speed, which in practice will require 24/7 cover.

b) To work with Public Health England / Public Health Wales to protect public health, although the specifics of this are not detailed in this particular contingency plan.

c) To promote and maintain good biosecurity measures and provide guidance on this when required. Biosecurity should be considered at all times but becomes a heightened importance during and immediately after an outbreak to prevent spread or reoccurrence of disease.
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/controlling-disease-in-farm-animals
http://wales.gov.uk/topics/environmentcountryside/ahw/biosecurity/?lang=en

d) To consider the local risks and priorities when responding to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. Refer to **Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak** for more information on this. This work should be completed in conjunction with a local authority's multi agency partners as detailed in **Chapter 4 Multi Agency Response**.

e) To keep accurate records of all checks completed, decisions made, and actions taken to control an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. This information will be needed for any subsequent inquiries and the European Union (EU) auditing process after an outbreak which is crucial to ensure the UK successfully receives the maximum levels of available reimbursement from the EU.

4. Multi Agency Response

1. This contingency plan template focuses on the responsibilities of the Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) in England and Wales during a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. As such this template is only intended to contain guidance on the role of the LAAHF during an outbreak and does not provide specific detail on the responsibilities of other partner agencies. This contingency plan should be considered in conjunction with the response of other national, regional and local partners and their relevant contingency plans, particularly local resilience forums (LRFs).

2. **Civil Contingencies Act and Local Resilience Forums**

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 outlines the role of local authorities in providing civil protection at a local level and places a statutory duty on them to maintain emergency plans for events or situations likely to cause serious damage to human

welfare and the environment, including an outbreak of an exotic notifiable animal disease.

3. LRFs are the principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Further information on the implementation of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is available at https://www.gov.uk/preparation-and-planning-for-emergencies-responsibilities-ofresponder-agencies-and-others.In summary local authorities, the emergency services and NHS bodies are Category 1 responders of LRFs. These organisations are at the core of the response to most emergencies. Category 1 responders may be supported by Category 2 responders such as the Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies if an incident affects their own sector.

4. LRFs promote co-operation between organisations in their preparation for responding to a major emergency, such as an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. It provides a forum for the consideration of emergency response issues where there are implications for more than one agency. An exotic notifiable disease outbreak is included in the National Risk Register (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/644968/UK_National_Risk_Register_2017.pdf) because it is considered to be likely to have a significant impact. LRFs are required to interpret the risks in the National Risk Register and the National Risk Assessment at a local level which forms the Community Risk Register. LRFs will also have a Civil Contingency Plan to outline how its multiple partners would respond to a major incident.

5. When an outbreak is confirmed, a Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) will be convened to support communities to rebuild, restore and rehabilitate following an emergency. Local authorities usually lead the RCG, although this is likely to be a multi-agency group. In addition to this, a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) may be set up to guide the response to the wider impacts of the outbreak. A Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) may be established to ensure that response issues can be addressed jointly, particularly where multiple local authorities within a LRF area are affected. If a SCG / TCG are established, they will usually hand over to the RCG when the incident is contained and there is no immediate risk of escalation.

National Partners

6. **Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for England / Welsh Government**
   Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for England (Defra) and the Welsh Government are the government leads for preparing for and managing an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak in England and Wales respectively. They

are responsible for establishing the structures and policies required to eradicate disease as outlined in their national contingency plans, which should be considered alongside this document. A series of control strategies accompany these national contingency plans for certain diseases including Foot and Mouth Disease and Rabies: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-animal-andplant-health/2010-to-2015-government-policy-animal-and-plant-health#appendix-3-controllinganimal-disease.

7. Animal and Plant Health Agency

The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) is an Executive Agency acting on behalf of Defra and the devolved Governments to lead the response to eradicate any outbreaks of exotic notifiable animal disease at a national and local level. The APHA has significant input into decisions made at a strategic level and it plays a fundamental role in ensuring effective communication occurs across Central Government and delivery partners, including the co-ordination of the tactical level response at the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC).

8. At a local operational level APHA has responsibility for leading the local disease operation which includes managing the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) and any Forward Operations Bases (FOBs) which will be located as close as possible to the infected premise(s). Other responsibilities include: inspection, sampling and disease identification; communication with local stakeholders and operational partners to ensure they are aware of their responsibilities in a disease situation; leading on identifying tracing of the disease source(s) and spread; co-ordinating the serving of notices and movement licences; working with delivery partners to organise enforcement activities.

9. Public Health England / Public Health Wales

During an outbreak Public Health England (PHE) / Public Health Wales (PHW) assess the impact of zoonotic disease on public health and provide health protection expertise and advice to the public, NHS professionals, directors of public health in local authorities and other relevant stakeholders. The term zoonotic means a disease that can be transmitted from animals to humans. (Not all exotic notifiable animal diseases are zoonotic.)

10. PHE / PHW would be involved in the disease response at a very early stage and, where appropriate, they would attend the NDCC at a national level and the LDCC at a local level. If the exotic disease has zoonotic potential, PHE / PHW would stand up its internal incident control structures to co-ordinate human health risk assessments. PHE / PHW have the lead responsibility for public health response and depending on the novelty and magnitude of threat, would provide specialist advice to responding agencies in order to minimise impacts on human health. This may involve the provision of scientific, laboratory and epidemiological support.

11. **Food Standards Agency**

The Food Standards Agency (FSA) work with Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA during a suspect or confirmed outbreak to provide relevant support with regards to food safety and hygiene and protecting the overall farm to fork production process. In practice this would involve attendance at the NDCC to provide input on any potential risks to consumers as a result of the suspect or confirmed outbreak. At an operational level, FSA staff may be involved in the initial identification of suspicion of exotic notifiable animal disease during routine antemortem and post-mortem inspections. Any concerns would immediately be referred to the APHA.

12. For diseases which may pass to other animals from disease contaminated meat or animal by-products, the FSA are required to designate slaughterhouses and as necessary cutting plants etc. to handled restricted meat and implement enhanced checks. Where meat plants are under the control of local authorities, local authorities may need to approve those processing plants which have elected to put in place the necessary controls to be designated as treatment centres.

13. **Department for Communities and Local Government**

The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Resilience Team and the Chair of the relevant LRF will be notified of a suspect or confirmed outbreak by APHA. Dependent on the situation this is likely to trigger a local multi agency response via the LRF as briefly summarised at the start of this chapter. DCLG would attend the NDCC and the relevant LRF would attend the LDCC.

14. **Environment Agency / National Resources Wales**

During an outbreak the Environment Agency (EA) in England or Natural Resources Wales (NRW) focus on ensuring the environmental impacts of an outbreak are managed. The EA / NRW provide expert advice and have a regulatory role for certain waste management and disposal activities, including disposal of carcases, animal by-products, manures and wash-waters. The EA / NRW provide advice on pollution prevention measures (for example in relation to the use of disinfectants and biocides for biosecurity and cleansing and disinfection purposes) and monitor the environmental impacts of an outbreak.

15. **Local Government Association / Welsh Local Government Association**

The Local Government Association (LGA) and Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA) would be responsible for leading the local government media response at a national level, supporting council media teams, producing briefing materials for local authorities and Councillors, and for representing local authorities at Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) meetings and NDCC meetings. If the LGA / WLGA are not in attendance at NDCC meetings, the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) would represent local authorities on their behalf. The WLGA would also attend the Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) if it was activated. (Further information on these communication meetings is available in the next chapter.)

16. During an outbreak the communications teams of affected local authorities should liaise closely with the LGA / WLGA's communications team. The LGA / WLGA would take a proactive role in high profile outbreaks to help protect the reputation of individual councils, and local government as a whole.

17. **Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers**
In an outbreak situation ACTSO support Defra / the Welsh Government / APHA with the dissemination of key operational information to animal health and welfare officers in local authorities in England and Wales. ACTSO also provide policy and secretariat support to the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel.

Regional / Local Partners

1. Animal and Plant Health Agency (Field Services Office)

At a local level, the Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) are encouraged to maintain a good relationship with their APHA field services office, in particular the Resilience and Operational Managers (ROMs) and Readiness and Resilience Managers (RRMs). Contact details for the APHA field services offices can be found at:https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-and-plant-health-agency/about/access-and-opening. It is also advisable that key LAAHF staffs are signed up to receive information alerts from APHA's subscription service. Refer to **Chapter 10 Responding to an Outbreak - Point 8(g)** for more detail on this.

2. Public Health England / Public Health Wales (Local Office)

The Local Health Protection Teams of PHE / PHW and the local authority's Director of Public Health would work closely with the APHA via the LDCC to address the public health needs involved in responding to a disease outbreak. They would also input into a LRF's response.

3. Local Resilience Forum

As detailed in Defra's national contingency plan "the LAAHF provides an informed link between the APHA, local authorities and the local resilience forums". This plan must link with LRF emergency planning procedures to ensure that multi agency partners are appropriately alerted to suspect and confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease. Refer to **Chapter 9 Notification and Activation of this Contingency** Plan for further information.

4. To aid a co-ordinated multi agency response, it is recommended that the LAAHF works with their local authority's emergency planners and other multi agency partners to create a specific LRF exotic notifiable animal disease response plan, which would sit alongside this local authority contingency plan. This LRF plan should provide an overview of the role of partner agencies, the local disease control priorities and the agreed triggers on how and when partners will be alerted of a suspect or confirmed outbreak.

5. **Neighbouring Local Authorities**

Local authorities may wish to consider creating cross border warrant authorisation agreements with neighbouring authorities to enable additional staff to be drafted in during an outbreak situation. Local authority officers do not have automatic jurisdiction in other counties so provision may be required to swear in officers, if required. An example memorandum of understanding for this type of agreement can be found in **Annex F**.

5. Command Structures and Communications in an Outbreak

1. Communications are an integral part of responding to an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. It is paramount to handle communications effectively during suspect and confirmed disease outbreaks to ensure all relevant agencies are aware of the unfolding situation and that they are receiving and responding to the most up-to-date information.

2. Equally communications must be handled carefully to manage the wider impact of the situation in terms of what information is released to the general public and the subsequent effect this could have on the agricultural industry, local and national commerce.

Key events when an outbreak situation arises

3. Detailed information on the alert processes for suspicion of disease and command structures, if disease is confirmed, are available in Defra's and the Welsh Government's national contingency plans. Some of the key points discussed in these documents are summarised below:

a) **Suspicion of Disease** – there is a legal duty on any person who suspects that an animal may have a notifiable disease to report their suspicion to the Secretary of State / Welsh Ministers via the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA). If the report leads APHA to suspect disease may be present, an investigation will be carried out by a Veterinary Inspector and the APHA Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Disease Unit (VENDU) will be informed that an investigation is underway.

b) **Premises Placed Under Restriction** – the premises where disease is suspected may be placed under restrictions preventing any movement on or off the site. If disease cannot be ruled out by the investigating vet, samples may be taken for laboratory testing. At this stage disease could be confirmed based on clinical grounds, although this is only likely to happen if there is an ongoing outbreak and a known epidemiological link to confirmed disease. In theory, local authorities should be informed about the concern of potential disease at the point when samples are taken, however, these timelines may vary dependent on the judgement of the local APHA office and the circumstances of each individual situation. The need for early notification to an affected local authority is something that the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and ACTSO continue to campaign for to maximise the preparation time a local authority has to respond, if required.

c) **Notification within Central Government** - VENDU is responsible for initially notifying various officials if there is sufficient concern about a suspicion of disease.

This will include the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) for all devolved administrations, Government officials and APHA senior management. Following this notification, a series of case conferences may be held to discuss the emerging issues and to consider whether an amber teleconference should be triggered by the CVO UK's office. A standard alert system is used to indicate the disease status:

- White – disease is not present or suspected in the UK;
- Black – risk of disease is higher than normal e.g. disease may be suspected or confirmed in a nearby EU member state;
- Amber – strong suspicion of the presence of disease on a particular premise based on clinical picture, following a veterinary investigation; and
- Red – disease confirmed or that an operational response has been initiated.

d) **Amber Teleconference** – If suspicion of disease is strong and its presence cannot be ruled out on clinical grounds, an amber alert teleconference will be held to assess the risk of the situation and agree on the next steps required to respond to the situation. This is chaired by the CVO UK. The relevant CVO may decide to confirm disease (raising the alert from amber to red) or specify what further evidence, such as test results, would be needed. If a veterinary risk assessment indicates an unacceptable risk in waiting for laboratory test results, the CVO may take the decision to move to red alert without waiting for those results which could result in a pre-emptive cull of affected animals (slaughter on suspicion).

e) **Disease Confirmation** – If disease is confirmed by positive laboratory test results, or the relevant CVO makes a decision to confirm disease at the amber teleconference stage, command and control structures are put in place to direct and co-ordinate the disease control response. The lead agencies for co-ordinating this response are Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA.

Command Structures for an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

4. The response levels for reacting to exotic notifiable animal disease are defined as:

    - Strategic Direction and Commissioning Level – The national government response is co-ordinated through strategic direction from Ministers and senior officials. In addition, and depending on the outbreak, COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) may be convened by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.
    - Tactical Level – the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) is led by the CVO UK. In Wales the Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) may also be activated.
    - Operational Level – the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) is led by APHA.

5. Further information on command structures in Great Britain can be found in **Annex C**. It is acknowledged there are differences in opinion regarding command structures and the different levels of command between the animal health and emergency planning communities. As Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA are the lead agencies for co-ordinating responses to exotic notifiable animal disease incidents, their command structure (as depicted in Annex C) would be used and it is important that LRF emergency planning arrangements recognise these differences and plan accordingly.

6. During an outbreak, the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) and Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) command structures of LRFs will primarily liaise and be briefed by the LDCC. If a disease is zoonotic close liaison would also take place with Public Health England (PHE) / Public Health Wales (PHW).

7. The NDCC and the LDCC operate around a set battle rhythm which is outlined in Table 1 for England and Table 2 for Wales below. This provides a structure for the management of the outbreak to enable a co-ordinated multi agency response, although a battle rhythm would be proportionate dependent on the disease and the perceived level of risk i.e. a decision may be made to operate a more or less condensed version.

8. As part of this battle rhythm, the NDCC and LDCC hold regular bird-table meetings to ensure effective communications and a co-ordinated response between all policy, operational and communications functions involved. Local authorities, SCGs and TCGs should be mindful of this schedule and aim to arrange internal briefings after key NDCC and LDCC updates to enable sharing of the latest information on the situation and avoid scheduling conflicts. Local authorities would be involved in inputting into the LDCC bird-table meetings and ACTSO or the LGA / WLGA would input into amber teleconferences and NDCC bird-table meetings. ACTSO maintain regular communication with affected local authorities during an outbreak so these local authorities would also have an in-direct input into NDCC bird-tables via ACTSO.

Table 1: Battle Rhythm from Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals

Time	Level	Event
0800 – 0830	**Strategic**	**Daily Strategic Stock take**
	Operational	**Daily Management and Communications Meeting**
0830 – 0900	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	LDCC Bird-table
0900 – 0930	Tactical	Daily Communications Meeting **– APHA / Defra brief all parties involved**
1000 – 1100	**Strategic**	**National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) – NSC (THRC)**
1130 – 1200	**Strategic**	**Defra Media Briefing**
	Operational	**Media Briefing**
1200 – 1230	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	LDCC Bird-table
1400 – 1430	**Tactical / Operational**	**LDCC Management Teleconference**
1500 – 1600	**Strategic**	**NSC (THRC)**
1800 – 1830	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	LDCC Bird-table
Ad-hoc	**Strategic**	**Animal Disease Policy Group**
	Tactical	**National Experts Group**
	Operational	**Disease Emergency Response Committee (DERC)**
2100 approx.	**NDCC Management Information and Reports Team**	**Daily report compiled and circulated – to provide a comprehensive situation report on all aspects**

Table 2: Battle Rhythm from the Welsh Government's Contingency Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases

Time	Level	Event
0800 – 0830	**Strategic**	**Daily Strategic Stock take**
	Operational	**Daily Management and Communications Meeting**
0830 – 0900	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	LDCC Bird-table
0900 – 0930	Tactical	Daily Communications Meeting
0930 – 1000	**Tactical**	**Chief Veterinary Officer (Wales) (CVO(W)) Daily Review**
1000 – 1100	**Strategic**	**National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) – NSC (THRC)**
1000 – 1030	**Tactical**	**Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) (ECC(W)) Bird-table**
1130 – 1200	**Strategic**	**Defra Media Briefing**
	Operational	**Media Briefing**
1200 – 1230	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	LDCC Bird-table
1230 – 1300	**Tactical**	**ECC(W) Bird-table**
1300 – 1330	**Tactical / Operational**	**CVO(W) / Outbreak Director Wales / Policy Adviser catch-up**
1400 – 1430	**Tactical / Operational**	**LDCC Management Teleconference**
1500 – 1600	**Strategic**	**NSC (THRC)**
1700 – 1730	**Tactical**	**ECC(W) Bird-table**
1800 – 1830	Tactical	NDCC Bird-table
	Operational	LDCC Bird-table
1800	**Tactical**	**ECC(W) situation report sent to Outbreak Co-ordination Centre Operations Team**
Ad-hoc	**Strategic**	**Animal Disease Policy Group**
	Tactical	**National Experts Group**

9. At the commencement of an outbreak, APHA's Corporate External Communications Liaison Manager will make contact with the affected local authority's communications team, who will be involved in the daily communications meeting at 9.00am, as detailed in Tables 1 and 2.

10. During an outbreak ACTSO will disseminate relevant messages from Defra / the Welsh Government to all local authorities in England and Wales, as agreed at amber teleconferences, communication meetings, and NDCC bird-table meetings. This information will be shared via email immediately following these briefings and will be circulated to Heads of Service and lead animal health contacts, as previously identified to ACTSO. It is therefore important to inform ACTSO of any staff changes by emailing admin@actso.org.uk.In addition, Defra / the Welsh Government's websites will be a key source of information for accessing up-to-date information.

Internal Local Authority Communications

11. The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF), Emergency Planning and Communication departments should establish effective processes for sharing the latest information on the outbreak situation. This is important for ensuring all local authority staff are making decisions based on the most up-to-date information, particularly for staff working out in the field, and to encourage an organisation-wide effective response.

12. Elected members will be interested in an exotic notifiable animal disease situation and may face direct queries from members of the public and stakeholders. The Communications department would take the lead in proactively engaging with elected members, however, direct contact with the LAAHF and Emergency Planning would also support this relationship e.g. providing a joint briefing session from these departments. It is vital that immediate verbal responses provided by elected members only relay information already publicly issued by the local authority.

Releasing Information to the Public

13. During an outbreak affected local authorities will be expected to release warning and informing communications. The upmost care must be taken when releasing any written or verbal information into the public domain. Local authorities will need to ensure that communications to the media and public follow the national briefing line but also include local emphasis.

Local authorities should only release specific information about the disease outbreak to the public which has already been publicised on Defra / the Welsh Government's website.

14. Whilst media reports need to be honest, caution must be exercised to prevent the spread of scaremongering stories that could be harmful to the agricultural industry and its recovery in terms of export trade and public confidence. That said, local authorities should aim to be proactive with releasing information updates to prevent the release of misleading or unhelpful stories. This should be done in liaison with Defra / the Welsh Government's press office and may involve setting up a media briefing room close to the source of an outbreak. Ideally representatives from the press team of the local authority, Defra / the Welsh Government, APHA and the police should be involved at press conferences. Additionally, social media will be an important tool in communicating with the public.

15. It will be advisable for communications teams in the affected authorities to liaise closely with the Local Government Association (LGA) / Welsh Local Government Association's (WLGA) communications team who can provide advice and support, as well as APHA's press office.

16. Further guidance on specific operational communications tasks are also listed in **Chapter 10 Responding to an Outbreak**.

Scaling Down After a Suspect or Confirmed Incident

17. At a national level stand down procedures only commence upon notification from Defra / the Welsh Government and APHA, and in tandem with the official stand down of the national animal disease contingency plan. This will only be considered once there has been an acceptable period after the last disease confirmation, and upon consideration of veterinary opinion.

18. Some local authorities may be able to engage in a range of recovery activities before the national disease contingency plan has been officially stood down if the local area has not received a new disease confirmation for a period of time. It would be important for a local authority to discuss this matter with APHA before any recovery activities are commenced. Additionally, a local authority should refer to any stand down procedures in its generic emergency response plan and to any LRF recovery plans which may be in place.

6. Resources

1. In the operational section of this contingency plan, the Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) are asked to consider and populate information on local risks and priorities, including a profile of all animal premises, and the staff and equipment resources required to response to an outbreak situation. Refer to **Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak** for more information.

2. In addition to this, senior management of a local authority should consider the financial forecasting implications when preparing for and responding to suspect or confirmed cases of exotic notifiable animal disease. This should be done in conjunction with the Emergency Planning and Finance departments. Local authorities may be able to apply for EU reimbursement / Bellwin funding to recoup some of the costs associated with responding to an outbreak situation, where appropriate. Any such information on funding will be made available by Defra / the Welsh Government or the Local Government Association / Welsh Local Government Association at an appropriate time. ACTSO and the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel will help ensure that any such information is communicated to all local authorities.

7. Health and Safety

1. The health and safety of staff during an exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak should be considered in line with a local authority's existing health and safety and occupational health policies, with particular attention being drawn to the need for risk assessments, COSHH (control of substances hazardous to health) specifically in relation to the use of disinfectants and zoonotic diseases.

2. All staff must promote and practice effective biosecurity measures to minimise the risk of further disease spread or reoccurrence. Further information on biosecurity can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/controlling-disease-in-farm-animals and http://wales.gov.uk/topics/environmentcountryside/ahw/biosecurity/?lang=en.

3. During an outbreak the risks will vary dependent on the type of disease. Further information on health and safety can be found in the **disease annexes** that support this contingency plan, for example the provision of precautionary vaccinations during a rabies outbreak. Alternatively, a local authority may wish to contact the Health and Safety Executive or Public Health England / Public Health Wales for further advice.

Part 2: Operational Section

Introduction to the Operational Section

This operational section of the contingency plan has been designed for use by local authority officers with animal health and welfare duties. Local authorities are encouraged to input additional localised information into this section to facilitate a timely, more organised response in the event of an exotic notifiable disease outbreak. The Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) are encouraged to undertake this planning with their internal Emergency Planning department.

8. Preparing for an Outbreak

Local Authority Key Responsibilities

1. A local authority's key responsibilities in a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak are already listed in the strategic section of this plan. Please refer to Chapter 3 Local Authority Key Responsibilities.

Local Risks and Priorities

1. The LAAHF are encouraged to populate information about risks, resources and local premises in this section to assist officers in making quick informed decisions when responding to an outbreak. Some templates have been included to prompt ideas on the type of information that could be captured, although, local authorities may wish to re-design this section dependent on their specific needs and priorities or to ensure that reporting functions are readily available to generate this type of information at short notice from the LAAHF's databases.

2. This type of information can be very useful when making decisions during the initial response to a suspect or confirmed outbreak and it will assist local authority officers attending the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) and other response meetings.

3. Additionally, some local authorities may wish to do a more detailed SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) on how they would respond to a suspect or confirmed outbreak in their local area.

Table 3: Profile of Animal Premises in the Local Area

1) OVERVIEW OF PREMISES	
Premise Type	**Number of premises**
Livestock markets	1
Abattoirs	6
Slaughterhouses – red meat	0
Slaughterhouses – white meat	0
Cattle premises	782
Horse premises	143 (probably more than this)
Pig premises	627
Poultry premises	832 (probably more than this)
Sheep and goat premises	1691
Potential animal import premises	Unknown
Dog kennels	Unknown
Racecourses	0
Stables	Unknown
Processing plants	1 (Cat 3)
Knackers yards	0
Renderers / Incinerators	0
Livestock hauliers	11
Veterinary practices	Unknown
Other (please specify)	0
2) LOCAL RISKS IDENTIFIED *e.g. impact on local businesses if markets are cancelled, is it an intensive agriculture area?*	
Ashford animal market – significant regional impact on trade if closed.	
3) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS *e.g. unique geographic characteristics like large areas of wetlands*	
Romney Marsh – low lying area, heavily farmed for sheep; N downs.	

Resources to Respond

4. Following activation of this contingency plan, a local authority should consider its available resources when planning a short, medium- and long-term response to a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak. Local authorities are a Category 1 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and this may have already been considered through a local authority's business continuity management arrangements.

5. Defra / the Welsh Government and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) categorise outbreaks as follows:

   - Category 1 – Single disease. 1 Infected Premise (IPs). No complex factors involved (i.e. a simple disease case to deal with). Duration is likely to be only a few months, including lessons learned exercise. Little political, public and or media interest after the initial announcements.

   - Category 2 – Single disease. More than 1 IPs mainly within the same control zone, in the same close geographic area or with clear business links between IPs or are within the same company structure (geographic spread of IPs may indicate a category 3 outbreak). End to end duration up to six months, including lessons learned exercise. Greater political, public and or media interest at the initial announcements, but reduces quickly.

   - Category 3 – Two concurrent diseases. Up to 20 IPs with a geographic spread and few business links between IPs. End to end duration of 6 - 12 months which could involve an external inquiry.

   - Category 4 - Three or more concurrent diseases. More than 20 IPs with geographic spread and few business links between IPs or not within the same company structure. End to end duration of more than 12 months. Likely to involve one or more external inquiries. High level of sustained political (COBR involvement), public and or media interest.

Staff Resources

6. Under Section 52 of the Animal Health Act 1981 a local authority can appoint as many inspectors and other officers as it believes is necessary for the execution and enforcement of this Act. As part of the contingency planning process, KCC and/or Medway Council has the following staff roles that can potentially be available to respond.

Table 4: Local Authority Staff Resource Log

Roles	LAAHF Team	Other LA Staff	Partner agencies
Trained LA Inspectors ***With enforcement powers***	26 staff (6 PTSO; 20 TSO)		
Untrained LA Inspectors ***No enforcement powers***	0		
Other field staff ***No enforcement powers***	2 Accredited Financial Investigators		
Admin Support	10		
Other Staff	5 (managers – 1 head of service, 4 Operations Managers)		
Staff required for business as usual activities	15 PTSO / TSO and 2 or 3 OM's		

Equipment Resources

7. **Annex D** provides an indicative guide of the type of equipment a local authority may need to respond to an outbreak. It should be noted that equipment needs will vary dependent on the type of disease and further information on this is available in the relevant **disease annex**.

8. The preparation, maintenance and accurate logging of equipment stores are vital peacetime activities i.e. not during an outbreak. Local authorities must ensure this work is regularly completed and that there are established links, and ideally agreements, in place with suppliers to facilitate a swift response to an outbreak. Equipment checks should be recorded in the **review log** of this document and damaged equipment must be replaced immediately.

9. Notification and Activation of this Contingency Plan

Receiving Notification of Suspect or Confirmed Disease

1. The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) regularly investigates suspect disease and such investigations should be seen as routine. For suspect cases where disease cannot be ruled out and samples are taken, APHA will contact the relevant Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) by telephone to inform them that they have placed the suspect premises under restriction.

2. **If the LAAHF receives information regarding a suspect case from any source other than the APHA, they should immediately contact APHA.**

3. APHA will notify the LAAHF via telephone using the pre-agreed contact numbers as detailed in the alerting flowchart overleaf. APHA will share a copy of the premise's restriction notice (NDI 1 form) with a LAAHF, however, this can only be sent to a secure email account. If the disease in question is zoonotic (i.e. it can be transmitted from animals to humans) APHA will also contact Public Health England / Public Health Wales.

4. APHA operate a 24-hour continuous service all year round. It is the LAAHF's responsibility to ensure the APHA field services office is aware of it's out of hours emergency contact procedures and relevant phone numbers. This information should be recorded in the **Contact List in Annex A**. (If a LAAHF does not provide an out of hours service, this may be covered by the local authority's emergency planning department / organisation wide out of hours contact service, a multi-agency partner, or even a neighbouring authority.)

Activating this Contingency Plan

5. **When the LAAHF initially receives notification of a suspect or confirmed case of exotic notifiable animal disease from the APHA, the relevant Head of Service and Emergency Planning department must be informed immediately.** It is advisable that this plan should be activated at this stage, although this should be discussed in line with a local authority's existing internal arrangements. A decision should also be made on whether other key partners should be notified, such as LRF partner agencies.

6. The LRF is the principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. To allow a measured and appropriate response to suspect exotic notifiable animal disease it is important to ensure that LRF partner agencies and any other key partners of the LAAHF are alerted in line with pre-agreed triggers. The principles of an initial notification process have been demonstrated in the flowchart below. The specific triggers and emergency contact procedures should be agreed locally for both suspect and confirmed disease and considered alongside information in **Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak.**

7. When agreeing this notification process, it should be agreed which exotic notifiable animal diseases are likely to have a larger impact on the local region and should therefore be classified as a higher priority that would trigger an earlier notification to the LRF. Putting this in the context of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA), this would be which disease are likely to meet the definition of an emergency under the CCA. If a LAAHF receives notification of suspect or confirmed disease that has not been classified as high priority, they will liaise with the Emergency Planning department and Director of Public Health (if applicable for zoonotic disease) to monitor the situation and will only trigger a full LRF alert if this is deemed necessary as over-alerting can prompt false alarm and unnecessary preparations. It is important to stress the need for confidentiality and limiting the circulation of this type of sensitive information, which should only be shared on a need-to-know basis.

Diagram 1: The Initial Notification Process

The notification process for suspect and confirmed outbreaks must be agreed locally and the relevant contact details inputted into this template. Contact should be made by phone wherever possible.



10. Responding to an Outbreak

1. Following notification of a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal outbreak from the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), the Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) needs to ensure that the Heads of Service for their department and the Emergency Planning department are informed of the situation immediately, if they are not already aware.

2. Particular consideration needs to be given to the following points, which have been grouped into suggested tasks during the suspicion phase and suggested tasks if disease is confirmed. Local authorities may wish to populate these tasks into a tabular format to monitor progress made against individual tasks and identify staff responsibilities.

Suggested Tasks - Suspicion Stage

3. The hours between notification of suspicion of disease and confirmation of disease can be vital to the initial response. During suspicion the LAAHF should review its contingency plans and monitor the situation, in liaison with the APHA and the local authority's Emergency Planning department, to establish whether a short, medium- or long-term response is anticipated. Initial preparations are vital at this stage and dependant on the disease the following aspects may need to be considered.

   a) Consider what **resources** are required to respond to the outbreak.

   b) Take direction from the APHA on expected timescales for laboratory results and the locations of the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) and Forward Operations Base (FOB). Whilst planning, remember the relevant Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) has the option to approve slaughter on suspicion ahead of laboratory test results.

   c) Assess and map potential disease control zones.

   d) Confirm what relevant enforcement controls may be required in control zones, including any temporary control zones e.g. footpath and road closures.

   e) Liaise with police on potential resource for mobile roadside vehicle checks. If disease is confirmed it is vital to ensure early enforcement of movement controls.

f) Update the profile of the animal premises in the local area and identify which businesses are likely to be affected. (See **Table 3 in Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak**.)

g) Ensure data records on livestock premises and movements are up to date.

h) Undertake a quick equipment stock check and ensure there is sufficient biosecurity equipment supplies available (see **Annex D**). Consider what other services within a local authority may have reasons to visit livestock premises and ensure biosecurity guidance is relayed to them.

i) Establish horizon scanning procedures to identify potential operational / logistical problems and appropriate solutions, in liaison with emergency planning.

j) Check contact numbers for key multi agency partners (see **Annex A**).

k) Consider how staff can be contacted out of hours, if disease is confirmed.

l) Ensure potential 24/7 office access, staffing and IT resources, and consider a potential control area with adequate phones for 24/7 operation. Consideration should also be given to whether staff can access data in the field or whilst at LDCC meetings.

m) Review any health and safety considerations specific to the potential disease. Refer to the **disease annexes** for more information and if the disease is zoonotic contact the local **Public Health England / Public Health Wales** centre for guidance.

n) Consider alerting neighbouring LAAHF's, if appropriate.

o) Consider placing all potential guidance, law and forms in one location to allow easy access if confirmed.

p) Consider creating or obtaining a disease summary document to relay important information to the local community. An example of this can be found in **Annex E** and further examples are available on the Knowledge Hub and the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel's page on ResilienceDirect.

q) Ensure data sharing agreements are available with APHA e.g. to allow local authorities to access information from the National Poultry Register.

r) If a suspect outbreak is negated, undertake a lesson learnt exercise to review what improvements could be made to responding to an outbreak in the future.

Suggested Tasks – Confirmed Disease

4. Following notification of a confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak the following tasks should be considered.

5. **Resources**

a) Establish staff numbers required to effectively enforce disease control legislation. Identify staff availability including total staff numbers available for enforcement, licensing and advice (refer to **Chapter 8 Preparing for an Outbreak**). Ensure officer authorisations are up-to-date and appropriate for all tasks including the serving of notices where required.

b) Establish roles within the LAAHF and other relevant internal teams and delegate tasks. This is likely to involve interaction with a number of internal departments (Trading Standards, Emergency Planning, Communications, Public Health, Highways, Elected Members, HR, Finance, Education and Social Services, District Councils for Environmental Health services and possibly neighbouring local authorities if an inter authority working arrangement is in place). Reference should be made to the local authority's generic emergency response plan which may contain default arrangements for roles and responsibilities. It is important to ensure a LAAHF officer is present to advise the local authority's Tactical Commander and the following roles may also be useful:

- LDCC Liaison Officer - Identify a specific contact to allocate requests received from APHA and provide efficient updates on progress against these tasks.

- Intelligence Officer - Identify a specific contact to record all information received from Defra / the Welsh Government, APHA, partners, the public and mobile patrols. This is particularly important for ensuring suspect / infected premises are correctly identified and accurately plotted on maps.

c) Ensure Health and Safety officers are contacted, and appropriate risk assessments are in place for disease control, including relevant COSHH assessments and infection control policies for zoonotic disease risks. If the disease is zoonotic contact the **local Public Health England / Public Health Wales centre**. Relevant training must be given to staff as needed.

d) Ensure appropriate quantities and types of personal protection equipment is available for all staff and that Defra / the Welsh Government approved disinfectant is available for the type of disease.

Defra: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/defra-approved-disinfectant-when-and-how-to-use-it

e) Produce maps to mark disease boundaries for enforcement controls.

f) Produce road and footpath signs to raise awareness of disease control measures in liaison with APHA. Refer to **Annex G** for further information on outbreak signage guidance.

g) Ensure IT and website requirements are identified, and financial forecasting is completed.

6. Data - Up-to-date, accurate and easily accessible data is essential for effective disease control. Ensure sufficient resource is provided to maintaining data on livestock premises, including hobbyist premises, this will be a valuable resource in identifying possible affected premises on suspicion or confirmation of disease. The LAAHF should consider the following data tasks.

a) Retain a log of events, decisions made, and actions taken. Ideally this log should be maintained by one person. In addition, all officers and managers are encouraged to keep their own individual logs. Capturing this information is important to demonstrate a local authority acted effectively in attempting to control disease for any subsequent inquiries.

b) Establish the geographical extent of the outbreak – are other local authorities affected?

c) Keep accurate financial records of all costs associated with responding to the disease outbreak. These will be needed to claim eligible EU reimbursement / Bellwin funding (if applicable) for some costs associated with responding to the outbreak. Any such information on funding will be made available by Defra / the Welsh Government or the Local Government Association / Welsh Local Government Association at an appropriate time.

7. **Prevention of spread of disease** - A well-co-ordinated, clearly communicated and timely multi agency approach is required for effective control of disease. Direction is given by the APHA for disease control and the local authority must appoint suvfficient staff, as they feel appropriate, to enforce disease control requirements. As part of this enforcement role the LAAHF should consider the following tasks, alongside the local authority's Tactical Commander and Emergency Planning department.

   a) Agree the key objectives for disease control and enforce restrictions and movement controls in partnership with APHA and the police.

   b) Ensure all staff and operational managers have awareness of relevant legislation and local authority powers.

   c) Ensure staff are aware of health and safety requirements and have relevant PPE.

   d) Confirm what enforcement controls may be required in the control zones with APHA, including any temporary control zones.

   e) Establish suitable intelligence to uphold movement controls and investigate infringements.

   f) Undertake mobile roadside vehicle checks, in conjunction with the police. If disease is confirmed it is vital to ensure early enforcement of movement controls.

   g) Be prepared to close footpaths and roads around infected premises and other suspected premises upon request by the APHA. Refer to **Annex G** for further guidance.

   h) Monitor cleansing and disinfection (C&D) requirements and serve notices were necessary. Ensure pollution prevention controls are in place when meeting C&D and biosecurity requirements, in liaison with the local authority waste disposal team. Defra, APHA and the Environment Agency have produced joint guidance on the disposal of disinfectant wash water from C&D activities (this is available on the Knowledge Hub). Also consider the preferred routes for vehicles taking stock to renderers.

i) Identify livestock holdings requests and assist in the identification of otherwise unknown livestock holdings. Dependent on the type of disease and the type of animals affected, this may include door to door enquiries. Additionally, consider any unique geographic characteristics which may influence the response e.g. large areas of wetland, areas of intensive agriculture.

8. **Communications** - Timely and accurate communication is essential when responding to an outbreak situation and it is paramount to handle communications carefully. Further information on Communications can also be found in **Chapter 5 Communications**.

a) Ensure timely, targeted and appropriate updates are provided to the LAAHF team (in the office and out in the field), elected members, other internal departments, borough and district councils, neighbouring local authorities (if applicable) and other key partners.

b) Provide appropriate representation at the local authority's gold and silver control meetings and at the Local Resilience Forum's (LRF) response meetings.

c) Set up clear communication channels with APHA, this will normally be done via attendance at LDCC meetings (in person or via teleconferencing). Local authorities normally provide one permanent representative at LDCC. If a control zone covers multiple local authority borders or there are infected premises in multiple local authorities, it is advisable that one local authority takes the lead on this liaison.

d) Ensure an effective first point of contact is in place at the LAAHF office to handle enquiries and updates from partners, the farming community and the public.

e) Work with the local authority communications team to maintain a pro-active system for releasing information to the media, farming community and general public. Communications need to be handled carefully and must be in line with national guidance as issued by Defra / the Welsh Government, the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) and Local Government Association (LGA) / Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA). Liaison should also be made with the multi-agency strategic (gold) communications group covering the LRF area, which may be considered the appropriate channel to issue locally co-ordinated and agreed messages to the public and media. Updates could be provided to the public by:

- Local authority website and social media;

- Local radio, television and newspapers;
- Leafleting at community hubs e.g. libraries, schools;
- Setting up a dedicated helpline;
- Text messages and social media; and
- Mail shots.

f) Consider if there is a need to set up a media briefing room close to the source of the outbreak. This can be helpful in preventing the media generating misleading stories about the outbreak.

g) Ensure relevant staffs are signed up to receive animal disease information alerts from the APHA Subscription Service.

http://animalhealth.system-message.co.uk/AH_subscribe_index.php

Contact List

Annex A

Please ensure the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) and the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) have up-to-date contact information for the Lead Animal Health Officer and out of hours contact arrangements. All contact lists should be reviewed on an annual basis.

1) Local Authority Out of Hours Emergency Contact Procedures

Insert details for the Council's out of hours emergency contact arrangements. If the same arrangements apply to multiple departments, this must be clearly specified.

Department	KCC Emergency Contact Number	Medway Emergency Contact Numbers
Animal Health and Welfare	03000 419191	07834 374201
Emergency Planning	03000 414999	01634 730097
Communications	03000 419191	01634 332449 / 07740 590 009
Highways, public footpaths and rights of way	03000 419191	
Other		

2) Local Authority Internal Contact List

Local authorities are encouraged to populate contact details here or insert contact names and add a link to an intranet contacts database (if available) although consideration should be given to how this would be accessed if internet services are not available.

Roles	Kent Contacts	Medway Contacts
Head of Service responsible for Animal Health and Welfare		
Lead Officer for Animal Health and Welfare		
Other Officers with Animal Health and Welfare responsibilities		
Resilience and Emergency Planning Manager		
Head of Service for Paid Services		
Head of Service for Communications		
Head of Service for Highways, Footpaths and Public Rights of Way		
Head of Service for Public Health		
Head of Service for Human Resources		
Head of Service for Finance		

3) Local / Regional Partners

Organisation Name	Contact Name	Telephone numbers *(include mobile no)*	Email	Website
APHA Field Services Office	Matt Henning	03000 200 301 / 0208 026 0176 / 020 8026 2038	Matthew.Henning@apha.gov.uk	https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animaland-plant-health-agency

Kent Resilience Forum	Via the Duty Emergency Planning Officer
District / Borough Councils	
Neighbouring Local Authorities	
Environment Agency	
Kent Fire and Rescue Service	
NHS England	
Police	
Public Health England	
Quarantine Carriers	
Local veterinary practices	
Farming industry trade bodies e.g. NFU	

4) National Partners

Organisation Name	Telephone numbers *(include mobile no)*	Email	Website
Defra	0345 933 5577 Monday - Friday 8am - 6pm 020 8026 2038 - OOH	defra.helpline@defra.gsi.gov.uk	https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-environment-food-rural-affairs
Natural Resources Wales	0300 065 3000 Monday - Friday 8am - 6pm	enquiries@naturalresourceswales.gov.uk	www.naturalresourceswales.gov.uk
Animal and Plant Health Agency	03000 200 301		https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/animal-and-plant-health-agency
Assoc. of Chief Trading Standards Officers			www.actso.org.uk
Local Government Association	020 7664 3333	media.office@local.gov.uk	www.local.gov.uk
Welsh Local Government Association	029 2046 8673 (not 24 hours)	enquiry@wlga.gov.uk	www.wlga.gov.uk
Environment Agency Incident Helpline	0370 850 6506	enquiries@environment-agency.gov.uk	https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/environment-agency

It is advisable to keep a note of the contact details that have been previously shared with APHA and ACTSO here:

Lead Officer for Animal Health	
Contact Name	
Job Title	
Email Address	

Mobile Number	
Emergency Contact (out of hours only)	
Emergency Contact Mobile Number	
Remit of this emergency contact cover? E.g. Civil Contingency Unit, whole local authority etc.	

Glossary of Terms

Annex B

ACTS	Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers
AH&W	Animal Health and Welfare
AHS	African Horse Sickness
AI	Avian Influenza
APHA	Animal and Plant Health Agency
ASF	African Swine Fever
C&D	Cleansing and Disinfection
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms
COSHH	Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
CSF	Classical Swine Fever
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
DARDNI	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
Defra	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (England)
EA	Environment Agency
ECC(W)	Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales)
EU	European Union
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
FOB	Forward Operations Base
FSA	Food Standards Agency
GIS	Geographic Information System
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
IP	Infected Premise
LA	Local Authority
LAAHF	Local Authority Animal Health Function
LDCC	Local Disease Control Centre
LGA	Local Government Association
Livestock	All animals (including poultry) susceptible to exotic notifiable disease
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
NAHWP	National Animal Health and Welfare Panel
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre
NFU	National Farmers Union
NHS	National Health Service
NRW	Natural Resources Wales
NSC (THRC)	National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience & Contingencies)
OIE	Office International des Epizooties (World Organisation for Animal Health)
OV	Official Veterinarian
PHE	Public Health England
PHW	Public Health Wales

PPE	Personal Protection Equipment
PZ	Protection Zone
RCG	Recovery Co-ordinating Group
RFM	Regional Field Manager (APHA)
ROM	Resilience and Operational Manager (APHA)
RPE	Respiratory Protective Equipment
RRM	Readiness and Resilience Manager (APHA)
SCG	Strategic Co-ordinating Group
SoS	**Secretary of State**
SWOT	**Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats**
SZ	**Surveillance Zone**
TCG	**Tactical Co-ordinating Group**
TCZ	**Temporary Control Zone**
TSSE	**Trading Standards South East**
VENDU	**Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Disease Unit, part of APHA**
VI	**Veterinary Inspector**
WG	**Welsh Government**
WLGA	**Welsh Local Government Association**
WNV	West Nile Virus

Command Structures in Great Britain Annex C

To be considered alongside the information in **Chapter 5 Command Structures and Communications in an Outbreak.**



Suggested Equipment List

Annex D

An indicative guide to the type of equipment a local authority may need to respond to an outbreak. Equipment needs will vary dependent on the type of disease, further information on this is available in the relevant disease annex.

Equipment Item	**Amount**	**Location**	**Contact responsible for maintenance / allocation equipment** *Include phone and email*	**Supplier details for ordering extra equipment** *Include contact details and website where appropriate*
Personal Protective Equipment				
Steel toe capped wellington boots or waders				
Overalls (preferably disposable)				
Breathable waterproof suit or coat and leggings				
Disposable gloves				
Hi-visibility jackets or vests				
Eye protection (goggles or visor)				
Vinyl gloves				
Safety helmet				

Dust masks				
Respirators				
First aid kit				

Equipment Item	**Amount**	**Location**	**Contact responsible for maintenance / allocation equipment** *Include phone and email*	**Supplier details for ordering extra equipmen** *Include contact details and website where appropriate*
Biosecurity				
Approved Disinfectants				See link for further guidance, disinfectant needs vary dependent on type of disease: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/defraapproved-disinfectant-when-and-how-touse-it
Buckets				
Scrubbing brush				
Long handled brush				

Pressure sprayer				
Anti-bacterial soap or wipes				
Paper towels				
Container carrying clean water				
Red and white barrier tape				
Signage for the public				

Disease Summary Sheet – Glanders

Annex E

This type of document could be used to communicate information to the local community. Local authorities would need to populate the information highlighted in yellow. Further examples are available on the Knowledge Hub and the National Animal Health and Welfare Panel's page on ResilienceDirect.

Following an outbreak of Glanders in XXX the following restrictions have been placed on any premises containing horses within a 3km zone as indicated in the adjacent map.

Insert map of the infected premises / any subsequent control zones.

Glanders is a highly contagious disease of equines caused by the bacteria, Burkholderia mallei (burk-hol-dare-EE-ah MAL-EE-eye). Glanders primarily affects horses, mules, and donkeys. Infection can also occur in dogs, cats, goats and camels. The disease can also be severe for hamsters and guinea pigs.

It is vital that all the controls are complied with to ensure that this disease can be quickly eradicated. If your premises are within the above zone below is a summary of the rules that you must comply with.

1. If you suspect that any horse or carcase is affected with disease it must be isolated from all other horses and reported to your local Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) office.

2. You must apply for a licence from the APHA before you move any horse or carcase to or from your property.

3. You must apply for a licence from the APHA before you move any fodder, manure, bedding, vehicle, equipment or other thing used or intended to be used for or in connection with horses, off your property.

4. You must ensure that any person entering or leaving your premises does so in accordance with the biosecurity guidance as detailed overleaf.

5. You must ensure that no horses are allowed to stray from your property.

6. If any horse dies on your property, the carcase must be isolated, and you must contact the APHA immediately.

7. A notice indicating that your property contains horses and is under restriction must be erected at any entrance to it.

Any alleged breaches of the above requirements should be reported to Insert Council Name on Insert Telephone Number. Full details of the full controls can be found on the Defra website at:

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-environmentfood-rural-affairs.

Commonly asked Questions

1) How does Glanders affect my animal?

The most common sign of infection in animals is yellow-green nasal discharge and ulcers on the nose. The horse may have enlarged lymph nodes and nodules on the skin. In some cases, they may look like long, hard ropes, under the skin. Severe coughing can also occur. Long term infections can occur in horses, which may last for several years. Disease in mules and donkeys can start rapidly (acute) and can lead to death in 1 to 2 weeks after exposure.

2) How can my animal get Glanders?

Horses get Glanders by close contact with other infected horses, especially through shared water and feed troughs as well as by nuzzling. The bacteria can also be spread by clothing, vehicles and equipment such as brushes, halters or harnesses. Carnivores, especially cats, can get Glanders after eating contaminated meat.

3) Can I get Glanders?

Yes. People can get Glanders by having direct contact with infected animals or contaminated objects. Entry of the bacteria occurs through the skin (wounds, cuts) or through surface of the eyes and nose. People in close contact with horses (veterinarians, farriers, other animal workers) are at greater risk for getting Glanders. In people, the disease can affect the skin, lungs, or the entire body. Signs may include fever, chills, muscle aches, and chest pain; pneumonia can rapidly develop. Nodules or ulcers may occur in the skin or the nose, eyes, or mouth.

4) Who should I contact, if I suspect Glanders?

In Animals – Contact the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) on 03000 200 301 immediately.

In Humans – Contact your doctor immediately.

5) How can I protect my animal from Glanders?

There is no vaccine available for Glanders, however, early detection of any spread of this disease will ensure that this outbreak can be quickly controlled and eradicated.

6) How can I protect myself from Glanders?

Prevention for people involves identifying and eliminating the disease in the animal population. If you see the signs or symptoms of Glanders in a horse, mule or donkey, call your veterinarian immediately and avoid contact with the animal. Wearing gloves and hand washing after contact with infected animals can greatly minimize your risk.

Biosecurity Guidance

Any horse keeper situated within the 3km control zone as indicated in the map over leaf must undertake the following biosecurity measures:

1. You must maintain a footbath containing disinfectant as specified by the APHA in a convenient position at every exit from your property which is renewed on a daily basis.

2. Any person entering or leaving any area on your property to which horses have access must wear overall clothing and boots which are disposable or capable of being disinfected.

3. Any person entering or leaving any area on your property to which horses have access must wash their hands and either thoroughly cleanse and disinfect their overall clothing and boots (with an approved disinfectant) or remove them before leaving your property.

4. Vehicles that are kept or used in areas of your premise that contain horses can only be moved off in compliance with an APHA licence, however, vehicles kept separately from horses may be moved off once all wheels have been cleansed and disinfected.

Although there are no legislative controls outside of the zone all horse keepers within Insert name of the local area are being encouraged to undertake the above precautions to stop any potential spread of this disease.

For further information or advice regarding Glanders, please visit the Defra website at: www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-forenvironment-food-rural-affairs or call the Defra helpline on **03459 33 55 77**.

If you require any further information on the controls in Insert Council Name, please call on Insert Telephone Number.

Cross Border Warrants - Memorandum of Understanding

Annex F

Example provided by the Central England Trading Standards Authorities partnership (CEnTSA).

CEnTSA Animal Health Cross Border Warrants

Memorandum of Understanding

Parties

1. The parties to this Memorandum of Understanding ('MoU') are the members of the Central England Trading Standards Authorities partnership (CEnTSA), namely:

• (Insert authority names)

Purpose of agreement

2. The risk of a contagious animal disease outbreak has increased over recent years, whilst resources available in individual authorities have declined.

3. To ensure that CEnTSA authorities can respond robustly to an outbreak, this agreement allows for officers within the region to be authorised by each authority, enabling additional resources to be deployed quickly in the first days of an outbreak.

Definitions

4. 'Requesting Authority' – The authority where the suspected or confirmed outbreak is located.

5. 'Responding authority' – Name for an authority that is providing officer support to the requesting authority.

6. 'Authorised Officer' – An officer listed in Schedule 2.

7. 'APHA' – Animal and Plant Health Agency

8. 'CEnTSA Authority' – Partners listed in section 1.

Arrangements

Authorisation

9. Each CEnTSA authority shall authorise the individual officers listed in schedule 2 to enforce the legislation listed in schedule 1 on behalf of their authority in the event of AHPA issuing a notification that a confirmed or suspected animal disease outbreak has occurred.

PPE & Competence

10. Each CEnTSA authority shall ensure that the officers listed in Schedule 2 are competent in Animal Health enforcement.

11. The requesting authority shall ensure that suitable personal protective equipment is provided to officers, unless they already have appropriate attire with them.

Activation

12. Authorised officers can only act on behalf of a requesting authority if the AHPA has issued a notification that a confirmed or suspected animal disease outbreak has occurred.

13. The requesting authority head of service or nominated duty manager must request assistance via their counterpart in a responding authority, this may be facilitated by the CEnTSA regional co-ordinator.

Response

14. The responding authority head of service or nominated duty manager must decide if the authority can respond to the request or not and this decision must be communicated to the requesting authority.

Review

15. The requesting authority shall review its resource requirements after a period of five calendar days and then agree with the responding authority head of service or nominated duty manager any request to retain officers for a further period of time.

Cost recovery

16. The responding authority will continue to be responsible for employment costs (excluding overtime payments) up to a maximum of five calendar days.

17. On the sixth day onwards, the requesting authority is then liable to pay an agreed day rate per officer per day to the responding authority, the cost recovery rate will be agreed between the two parties.

18. The requesting authority shall reimburse all reasonable expenses / overtime payments incurred by officers in the performance of their duties on behalf of the requesting authority.

General

Liability

19. Whilst an officer is acting on behalf of a requesting authority, that authority is liable for the employee's wellbeing and health & safety.

20. The requesting authority shall hold appropriate professional indemnity and public liability insurance.

Termination

21. The responding authority can terminate its assistance to a requesting authority by giving 12 hours' notice to that effect.

22. If the responding authority has an outbreak confirmed within its own area, it then only needs to give 3 hours' notice to the requesting authority.

Data Protection & FOI

23. All parties agree to comply with obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998.

24. Partners agree to comply with the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("FOI") in relation to this agreement.

Confidentiality

25. Partners agree to ensure any confidential information received via enforcement activity remains confidential other than for fulfilling a statutory, legal or parliamentary obligation.

Resolving Disagreements

26. Partners are committed to resolving any disagreements under this MoU bilaterally.

Review of the MoU

27. Amendments to this MoU may be made at any time by agreement between the partners.

Signatures

(Insert local authority name)	
Signature:	
Print Name:	Date:
(Insert local authority name)	
Signature:	
Print Name:	Date:

(Insert local authority name)	
Signature:	
Print Name:	Date:

Schedule 1

List of Specified Legislation

Animal Health Act 1981

Animal Health Act 2002

Animal Health and Welfare Act 1984

Animal Welfare Act 2006

Environmental Protection Act 1990

European Communities Act 1972

Including all regulations, orders and other secondary legislation made under any of the specified legislation above.

Schedule 2

List of Officers to Authorise

The following officers need to be authorised by each participating authority to act as an inspector / authorised officer / authorised person:

Local Authority	Officer Names

Outbreak Signage Guidance

Annex G

Animal Disease Outbreak Signage Guidance for Local Authorities

(Roads, footpaths and bridleways)

October 2016

1. Local authorities have a duty in certain circumstances to erect signs to indicate animal disease control zones[3] during a suspect or confirmed outbreak of some exotic notifiable animal diseases. Signage is used to raise awareness of an outbreak situation, to encourage local keepers and the public to search for further information on how an outbreak may affect them, and to identify an area/zone which is subject to animal disease movement controls. Signs may also be used to restrict access to certain land in order to prevent the risk of spreading the disease to other places. Initially a local authority's primary focus will be on road signs but there may be an additional need to consider footpaths and bridleways dependent on the location and type of disease.

2. The National Animal Health and Welfare Panel and Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) have developed this guidance and a new generic animal disease outbreak sign in partnership with Defra, the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), the Department for Transport (DfT), the Welsh Government and the National Police Chiefs' Council to encourage a consistent approach on this matter. Signage is, however, only one method of informing the local community about animal disease restrictions and the extent of control/restriction zones. Local authorities are encouraged to use additional communication methods such as leaflets, posters, the media, internet, social media and Defra's interactive map and alerts subscription service.

Planning and Deployment

3. **A Local Authority Animal Health Function (LAAHF) should discuss signage with the APHA as soon as they become aware of a suspect or confirmed exotic notifiable animal disease outbreak.** The signing of zones is a key regulatory function and helps to fulfil our warning and informing obligations under relevant disease control legislation. As part of the multi-agency contingency planning process the LAAHF should also discuss the creation, deployment and potential storage of outbreak signage with their Emergency Planning and Highways departments.

[3] Further information on control zones is available in Section 3.3 of the Local Authority Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease Contingency Plan.

4. Signs should be deployed as quickly as possible after the declaration or declaratory order imposing the control zones is made by a relevant government Minister to ensure early enforcement of movement controls.

5. It is acknowledged it may not be economically viable for individual local authorities to hold a pre-prepared store of outbreak signage, however, it is hoped that the introduction of a generic sign for all disease outbreaks will encourage the re-use of signs and/or neighbouring authorities to consider establishing joint or regional stores. Local authorities are also encouraged to have an arrangement in place with a traffic sign manufacturer as part of their contingency plans.

Design and Manufacture

6. The new animal disease outbreak sign adheres to transport legislation requirements and is located in Annex 1. Under the **Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016** No.362 animal disease can be classified as a civil emergency and a temporary traffic sign can be erected for as long as the outbreak exists in accordance with Schedule 13, Part 9.

7. Always liaise with your Highways department before ordering road signs. The DfT and Welsh Government have provided the following additional guidance:

    - Temporary signs must conform to the regulations for permanent signs which includes having a reflectorized material when they are required to be read during the hours of darkness.

    - Signs should be in upper case white legend on a red background with a white border.

    - An x-height (height of lower-case letter ‘x’) of 50mm would be suitable for traffic signs on 30mph roads, 75mm for 40mph, 100mm for 50mph, 150mm for 60mph and 200mm for 70mph. The overall size of the sign will vary according to the character height. Where the verge of footway width limits size, the next lower x-height increment may be used.

    - For safety reasons traffic signs should not contain telephone numbers, website addresses or email addresses as this may divert a driver’s attention away from the road. Commercial names must not be used on the signs; however, government agencies or local highway authority names are compliant.

- In Wales the signs will need to be bi-lingual.

8. Further information on the use of temporary traffic signs can be accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/temporary-white-on-redsigns-at-road-works

   https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/temporary-traffic-signs-forspecial-events.

Location of Signs

9. It is best practice to position outbreak signage on, or as close as possible to, the borders of the relevant control zones to advise road users that they are entering or leaving a control zone. Local authorities should always liaise with the APHA or use the interactive map to ensure their mapping systems accurately identify the most up-to-date control zones. N.B. Defra's online interactive map service is only activated during outbreaks and can be accessed via the relevant disease homepage on the gov.uk website e.g. for avian influenza this would be http://www.gov.uk/guidance/avian-influenza-bird-flu.

10. Signs should as a minimum be deployed on all major roads (excluding motorways). It is acknowledged that it will not always be possible to place signage on every road or lane and local knowledge should be used to identify minor roads which may be used by keepers of the susceptible species involved e.g. access to feed mills, animal gatherings or slaughterhouses.

11. Best practice would include the provision of additional signs to provide drivers with advance notice that a control zone is approaching - the word "ahead" could be added to the sign in Annex 1. Practically this may not be possible in the initial days of a zone being declared, given the need to deploy road signage as rapidly as possible.

12. The Highways department of a local authority are normally tasked with deploying outbreak signage and should have their own guidance on this. If further information on the design and positioning of warning signs is required, this can be found in Chapter 4 of the Traffic Signs Manual https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/traffic-signsmanual.

Removal / Review of Signs

13. The location of animal disease controls zones can quickly change, be merged or removed once disease spreads or when it is controlled or eliminated. It is important to conduct regular reviews to ensure outbreak signage accurately reflects the control zones. Changes should be made promptly to avoid misinformation.

Other Types of Outbreak Signage

14. **Footpaths** - Defra/the Welsh Government is responsible for making decisions relating to the closure or restricted access of public rights of way. It is unlikely that a policy decision would be made to close footpaths unless they run through an infected premise or adjacent to the boundary of a premises infected with either Foot and Mouth Disease, Swine Fever or Avian Influenza. The LAAHF should liaise with the APHA and their Rights of Way department on this matter. Annex 2 provides a suggested format for footpath closure signs. These are normally printed on A4 paper, laminated, and attached to existing posts.

15. **Bridleways** – It may be necessary for APHA to warn against use of bridleways dependent on the type of disease (e.g. Equine Infectious Anaemia) and if a bridleway runs close to an infected premise. APHA may also ask the local authority to place such warning signs on bridle paths or other public rights of way used by horse owners where they run close to an infected premise – see Annex 3. The same advice as footpaths applies.

16. Infected or otherwise Restricted Premises – APHA are responsible for serving restrictions on infected places (where livestock have tested positive for a disease) and the placement of restricted premises signs and warning tape. An example is shown in Figure 1

ANNEX G – ANIMAL DISEASE OUTBREAK TEMPORARY TRAFFIC SIGNS




ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE
ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE ENDS
NOTES:
1. The legend is from the Transport Medium alphabet at the x-heights shown.
2. The tile outlines do not form part of the sign.
3. COLOURS:
Background.....RED
Legend & Border.....WHITE
4. DIMENSIONS:
x-heights are in millimetres, other dimensions are in stroke widths. (4sw = x-height)
1.5
2.5
ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE
x–ht
40 min
200 max
1.5
2.5
2.5
1
ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE ENDS
Department for Transport
TEMPORARY SIGN
ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE

Drwg. no.

Notes: –

1. The legend is from the Transport Medium alphabet at the 'x'–heights shown.
2. The outlines of the tiles do not form part of the sign.
3. The colours are as follows: –
   Legend & border ——— White
   Background ——— Red
4. The illumination of the sign must accord with the requirements of the current 'Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions'.
5. The 'x'–heights shown are given in millimetres, all other dimensions are given in stroke widths (i.e. 1s/w = 1/4'x'–height).





REVISIONS	

Before using this drawing, confirm with RNM3 Division that it has not been superseded.

Drn. H.G.	Appd.
Chkd.	Appl. date 26.05.16
Issue: 26.05.16	
Scale: Photo–reduced	

Title

Temporary Signs

ANIMAL DISEASE CONTROL ZONE

WELSH GOVERNMENT

Drwg. no.

NOTICE

Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended)
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (England) Order 2006
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Scotland) Order 2006
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Wales) Order 2006

THIS FOOTPATH IS CLOSED ON ACCOUNT OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE

(Statutory Disease Control Measure)

By order of the: Secretary of State for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Scottish Ministers Welsh Ministers

This poster will last longer if enclosed in polythene

EXD71(FMD)(4/08)

ANNEX G – WARNING NOTICE FOR BRIDLEPATHS AND OTHER RIGHTS OF WAY

Notice to Equine / Horse Owners using this Right of Way

Disease Precautions – Equine Infectious Anaemia

Please do not use this section of path for exercising horses.

Equine Infectious Anaemia (a disease of horses, with no risk to humans) has recently been found in a horse that was kept in this area. The disease is being dealt with and the infected animal has been removed.

There is a low risk that the infection could be spread to horses in the immediate area by the bite of certain fly species.

Animal & Plant Health Agency and XXXX County Council respectfully ask that owners of horses do not use this right of way for exercising their horses, until further notice.

This right of way is NOT closed and there is no risk to human health. There is no risk of spreading Equine Infectious Anaemia through persons, dogs, or transport using this right of way and no specific precautions are necessary before going onto other equine premises.

Appendix O Risk Assessments for Animal and Plant Health

Kent Resilience Forum – Individual Risk Assessment (IRA):

Hazard / Threat Category	Kent Risk Ref	LRMG Risk Number(s)
ANIMAL HEALTH **Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (e.g. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Classical Swine Fever (CSF), Bluetongue and Newcastle Disease (of birds))**	**30**	6.1 H25
Date of Revision	**Next review date**	
January 2018	January 2021	
Overview of hazard or threat:		

Non-zoonotic notifiable diseases for example Foot and Mouth (FMD), Classical Swine Fever, Blue tongue, and Newcastle Disease leading to the slaughter of affected and exposed livestock plus the possibility of a significant number of animals being culled for disease control and/or welfare reasons.

The most serious disease in the non-zoonotic category is FMD which drives the impact assessments. It is one of the most infectious animal diseases known to man and spread by direct and indirect contact – may be windborne.

Assessment based on the need to cull and dispose up to 4 million animals across UK. For FMD whole of UK is likely to be declared a 'controlled area', prohibiting the movement of all susceptible livestock unless licensed.

Although the impact of a disease outbreak will vary between areas, the likelihood of a disease incursion cannot be differentiated between areas. Infected animals which are not yet exhibiting clinical symptoms may have been sold at market or moved to other premises before disease is detected resulting in widely dispersed multiple outbreaks.

Transmission to man is very unlikely and non-fatal.

This scenario is of a much greater scale than that seen in the outbreak in 2007 (cull of 2 million animals).

The most serious disease in the zoonotic category is Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, which drives the impact assessments.

Potential human health threat (203 deaths worldwide since December 2003).

Assessment based on the need to cull and dispose up to 30 million across UK.

Loss of disease-free status resulting in EU and third country import bans on live birds and poultry products.

Local and regional control zones will be imposed prohibiting the movement of all poultry and captive birds unless licensed.

Main impacts will be on the poultry sector and in particular on the welfare of birds and ability to move poultry to slaughter. There could be some disruption to rural communities, local economies, tourism and the environment.

Key historical evidence (last 5 years or of particular note):

• Newcastle Disease – 15/7/05 confirmed in pheasants in Surrey – no further cases after premises cleansed and disinfected.

• Foot and Mouth 2000/ 2001 – slaughtered 1,855,000 sheep, 415,000 cows, 110,000 pigs, 2,000 goats (total 2,382,000 animals).

• Classical Swine Fever - A serious outbreak in East Anglia in 2000 affecting 16 farms with 74,793 pigs slaughtered.

• Blue Tongue outbreaks in Kent farms at Boughton Aluph and Ide hill in 2007

• 2005 – 2006 DEFRA Preliminary Outbreak Assessments.

• 2005 – H5N1 confirmed in quarantine in the UK.

• 1992 – Avian Influenza confirmed in the UK.

• 1997 – Avian Flu Hong Kong - confirmed in 18 people, which killed 6 and the slaughter of 1.5 million poultry.

• 2003 –Avian Flu Netherlands, Belgium and Germany – resulted in the necessary slaughter of more than 28 million poultry.

• 2007 – Outbreaks of Avian Flu in Suffolk in February and November lead to the slaughter of thousands of turkeys.

• 2008 - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) found amongst dead wild swans at Abbotsbury in Dorset.

Likelihood	
Hazard	Likelihood
ANIMAL HEALTH - Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases	Medium (3)
Impact:	
Summary:	
Hazard	Impact
ANIMAL HEALTH - Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases	Limited (1)
Details:	
Impact associated with risk	
Primary	

Economic -2

- Outbreak of a disease in livestock leading to the slaughter of millions of animals
- Restrictions on livestock movement including EU/Third World import bans
- Financial hardship for livestock and poultry farmers as well as associated industries.
- Possible impact on the rural economy as a whole including tourism
- In Kent, agriculture accounts for 4% of total business activity and not all of this is livestock. It is therefore unlikely that an outbreak will have a significant impact on the economy of Kent and Medway as 96% of business is not related to agriculture. As such the economic impact for the area as a whole could be judged minor. This does take account of the fact that the effects for a small number of businesses will be significant and, in some cases, catastrophic.

Social-2

- Zoonotic disease will not have a significant effect on communities outside of rural areas and should not lead to displaced populations or any extraordinary burden on community services. There is likely to be some distress and disruption in areas close to farms.

Health – 2

- Non-zoonotic diseases do not infect humans
- Zoonotic diseases have a possible risk of human infection and consequent ill health/death from zoonoses

Secondary

Environment -1

As long as proper disposal protocols are observed for the carcasses of livestock and poultry, the environmental impact is manageable

Overall assessment:

Category:

ANIMAL HEALTH - Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases

Likelihood	Impact		Risk Rating
Medium (3)	Overall	2	**Medium**
	Fatalities	0	
	Casualties	1	
	Economic	3	
	Social Disruption	1	
	Psychological	2	

Controls in place:

Individual contingency plan or wider information can be obtained from the KRF capability requirements matrix's.

Local plans:
KCC
NHS England
PHE
DEFRA

KRF Plans:
KRF Pan Kent Strategic Emergency Response Framework
KRF Pan Kent Emergency Recovery Framework

Kent Resilience Forum – Individual Risk Assessment (IRA):

Hazard / Threat Category	Kent Risk Ref	LRMG Risk Number(s)
PLANT HEALTH **Notifiable plant diseases and Notifiable exotic invertebrate species destructive of plants (e.g. Brown Rot of Potato, Fireblight, Phytophthora sp., Asian Longhorn Beetle, Wheat Bug and Potato Cyst Nematode).** **Non-Notifiable but potentially destructive pathogens and exotic invertebrates (e.g. Ash Dieback and Emerald Ash Borer)**	50	HL43
Date of Revision	Next review date	
May 2016	May 2018	
Overview of hazard or threat:		

Notifiable and Non-Notifiable diseases and exotic invertebrate species with the potential to inflict significant damage to viability of certain cultivated and wild plant populations.

Serious plant disease and pest outbreaks affecting commercially important crop species can damage agricultural, construction, retail and other commercial sectors, and their supply chains, and create product supply shortages. In extreme circumstances plant diseases can have grave impacts upon human welfare, as is currently the case with the'Ug99' strain of Black Stem Rust of wheat in Africa and the Middle East, and the devastation of Asian rice harvests by Brown Spot in the 20th, and the Irish Potato Famine in the 19th Centuries.

The bacterium Xylella fastidiosa is currently spreading within Continental Europe and is locally devastating commercially important crop and ecologically significant wild plant species including Grape, Peach, Citrus, Olive, Oak, Acer, Euphorbia, Hebe, Lavender and Rosemary.

Plant disease and pest outbreaks within wild plant populations can also have very significant negative impacts upon biodiversity and landscape. There may also be (expensive) biosecurity, and health and safety implications arising from such outbreaks e.g. Dutch Elm Disease and latterly Ash Die-back.

Key historical evidence (last 5 years or of particular note):

- Asian Longhorn Beetle – outbreak at Paddock Wood in 2012 saw more than 1,300 trees felled and stringent biosecurity measures imposed within and around the outbreak zone.
- Ash Die-back – Destructive fungal pathogen outbreak affecting Kent's most widespread tree species discovered in 2012 triggering establishment of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group and wide-ranging biosecurity measures, which remain in place. Significant health and safety and linked financial implications for highway authorities, rail operators and managers of publicly accessible land.
- Phytophthora ramorum – An outbreak of this Notifiable fungal pathogen which affects a range of tree and shrub species, including commercially significant European Larch and Sweet Chestnut, began in 2009 and has inflicted considerable financial harm on forestry sector in western part of UK in particular.

Likelihood	
Hazard	Likelihood
PLANT HEALTH	3

Impact:	
Summary:	
Hazard	Impact
PLANT HEALTH	3

Details:
Impact associated with risk
Primary

Economic - 4

- Plant health outbreaks may affect a range of commercial sectors beyond agriculture and forestry.
- Potential for restrictions on plant movement including import and export bans.
- Financial hardship for farming and forestry sectors as well as associated industries and retailers.
- Possible impact on the rural economy as a whole including tourism.
- Potential cost arising from health and safety interventions in response to tree diseases and pests can be significant, for example some 0.5m Ash trees grow adjacent to the public highway in Kent and at a conservative £800 per tree for safety works the total cost is £400m.

Social - 2

- Plant diseases and pests can potentially lead to product shortages and price hikes, as well as economic damage and significant unplanned costs to public and private sector purse arising from necessary health and safety interventions (such as tree removal and safety works) with resultant wider negative impacts upon society. Further, landscape change resulting from plant diseases, such as Dutch Elm Disease and Ash Die-back, may inflict cultural and emotional harm.

Health – 2

- The potential for basic foodstuff shortages and price increases, potential contamination of food chain (Ergotism, for example) and health and safety risks (hazards from infected trees in publicly accessible areas, for example) may all negatively impact human health.

Secondary

Environment - 4

- Potentially devastating impacts upon biodiversity, functioning of terrestrial eco-systems and landscape (including short to medium term negative impacts upon subsidence, erosion and natural flood storage).

Overall assessment:

Category:

PLANT HEALTH

Likelihood	Impact		Risk Rating
3	Overall	**3**	**High**
	Fatalities	1	
	Casualties	2	
	Economic	4	
	Social Disruption	2	
	Psychological	2	

Controls in place

- Defra Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Evidence Plan
- Defra Tree Health and Plant Action Plan
- Defra Multi-annual National Control Plan for the UK
- Plant Health (England) Order 2015
- UK Plant Health Risk Register
- Defra Protecting Plant Health – A Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain 2014
- Fera Contingency Plan for Serious Pest Outbreaks in British Trees
- Defra Chalara Management Plan
- Warning and informing strategy at the local level
- KRF Ash Die-back Action Plan
- KCC Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan



Kent County Council Animal and Plant Health Emergency Plan

Version 0.1 (October 2019)

Plan owner: Kent County Council (Director of Environment, Planning & Enforcement)